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THE PENNSYLVANIA PROJECT - THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT:*
PERSPECTIVES FROM WITHIN**
INTRODUCTION

There is public and internal concern over the functioning of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' The purpose of this Project is to
examine the present structure of the Supreme Court and its
jurisdiction, in order that some of the problems plaguing the highest
* At the time this Project was begun, and during the time interviews were
conducted with the Justices, the following were members of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania: Michael J. Eagen, Chief Justice, elected, 1959; Henry X. O'Brien,
elected, 1962; Samuel J. Roberts, elected, 1963; Thomas W. Pomeroy, elected, 1968;
Robert N. C. Nix, Jr., elected, 1971; Louis Lawrence Manderino, elected, 1971; Israel
Packel, appointed for interim term, 1977. In November of 1977, Rolf Larsen was
elected to the Court to replace Justice Packel. Justice Larsen took his seat on the,
bench in January, 1978, but was not interviewed for this Project.
** The Villanova Law Review would like to express sincere appreciation to the
following people, who generously shared their time and their knowledge about the
Supreme Court: Judge Alexander F. Barbieri, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania;
Norman S. Berson, member, Pennsylvania House of Representatives, chairman,
House Judiciary Committee; Anthony Scirica, member, Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, member, House Judiciary Committee; David A. Brackoniecki, clerk
to Justice O'Brien; Richard Dechambeau, clerk to Justice Manderino; James L.
McCann, clerk to Chief Justice Eagen; James Young, former clerk to Justice Pomeroy.
The gracious and tireless assistance of Philip J. Katauskas, clerk to Justice Nix,
deserves special mention.
1. In 1972, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania initiated a study of the state
appellate court system which was undertaken by the Institute of Judicial Administration.

THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE APPELLATE COURTS OF
PENNSYLVANIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED AREAS OF THEIR PROCEDURES AND

ADMINISTRATION 62 (May, 1972) [hereinafter cited as IJA REPORT]. The study was
concerned with three aspects of the appellate court system in Pennsylvania:
1) whether any of the appellate courts should sit in more than one city; 2) the
operations of the prothonotaries' offices of the three appellate courts; and 3) the
publication of official reports of the courts. Id. at 4. The IJA Report consists of rather
detailed description of the situation in the appellate system in 1972, analysis of this
situation and recommendations based on this analysis. The report stated: "Among
the results of the present system is a far too heavy caseload for most of the judges,
and a caseload for the Supreme Court that makes it almost impossible for it to
perform properly its law development function." Id. at 62 (footnote omitted). For a
statistical report of the Court's caseload, see Appendix; see also Potter, Foreword: The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1974-1975: Some Observations on Appellate
Process, 37 U. Pirt. L. REV. 217 (1975).
It should be noted that the number of opinions filed by the Court reflects only
a portion of the total burden on the justices. In addition to the numerous petitions for
allocatur and miscellaneous petitions which must be handled, the justices have
various administrative and rulemaking duties which consume much of their time. See
text accompanying notes 97-110 infra.
In a recent series of critical editorials, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused the
Court of unaccountability, secrecy, unforgivable delay in deciding cases, misuse of its
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court in Pennsylvania may be illuminated. 2 As there have been
previous articles and studies discussing the Court in a comprehensive fashion, 3 the approach of this Project will be to focus on the
views expressed by the justices in interviews with several members
of the Villanova Law Review staff.4 It is believed that the view from
the inside can provide both a practical and a necessary understanding of the issues, and it is felt that the views of the justices have not
been adequately disseminated to the legislature or to the public5 in a

rulemaking power, inadequate statistics, and lack of leadership. The Supreme
disgrace: Pennsylvania'stop court, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 19, 1978, § L, at 6, col.
1; The Supreme disgrace: A paralysis of justice, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 21, 1978,
§ A, at 10, col. 1; The Supreme disgrace: Delays Mock Justice, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Feb. 23, 1978, § A, at 10, col. 1; The Supreme disgrace: Failing to meet standards,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 27, 1978, § A, at 8, col. 1; The Supreme disgrace:Riding the
Chaos Circuit, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 1, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 1; The Supreme
disgrace: Secret and Unaccountable, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1978, § A, at 6, col.
1; The Supreme disgrace: A Superior example, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 6, 1978,
§ A, at 6, col. 1; The Supreme disgrace: Leadership by endurance, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Mar. 8, 1978, § A, at 10, col. 1.
It should be noted that this Project does not purport to either support or refute
these criticisms.
2. As a result of its study of the appellate courts of Pennsylvania, the Institute of
Judicial Administration concluded:
[I]t became clear during the course of the study that the entire appellate
process in Pennsylvania, including court structure, jurisdiction, number of
judges, place of sitting, financing, facilities, personnel, statutes and rules
regulating appeals, and internal operating procedures of the appellate courts,
is badly in need of a comprehensive review and revision.
IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
3. See, e.g., S. SCHULMAN, TOWARD JUDICIAL REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA (1962);
IJA REPORT, supra note 1; Amram & Schulman, The New Judicial Article and its
Implementation, 42 PA. B.A.Q. 9 (1970); Meyer, Court Administration in Pennsylvania, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 463 (1973); Potter, supra, note 1; Surrency, The Development of
the Appellate Function: The Pennsylvania Experience, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 173
(1976); Comment, Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, 75 DICK. L. REv. 465
(1970-71).
4. Personal interviews with the six associate justices were held during October
and November of 1977 while the Supreme Court was in session in Philadelphia.
Interviews with the justices' clerks were conducted in the same time period. The
interview with Chief Justice Eagen was conducted by correspondence due to the
additional restraints placed upon his time by administrative duties. Questions on
selected topics were asked orally of the justices. The responses of the justices were
written down by the authors as accurately as possible and later reconstructed and
transcribed for permanent referral. A copy of the transcription is on file at the
Villanova Law Review, Villanova, Pennsylvania. For the reader's convenience,
information in the text that was obtained from several of the justices will be cited to
"Interviews with the Justices." Information that emerged from the interviews with
the clerks will be treated likewise. Where the text explicates the response of an
individual justice, citation will be to, e.g., "Interview with Justice Nix." The first
citation to an interview will indicate its date parenthetically.
5. The lack of understanding of the Court's predicament was demonstrated by
an article in a Philadelphia newspaper. Amidst a critical view of the court, William
Ecenbarger wrote:
Any honest lawyer will tell you that the Supreme Court takes a long time to
dispose of cases, and when it finally does make a decision it doesn't always
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way that encourages understanding and correction of the problems
of the Court.
Pennsylvanians cannot realistically expect a faultless system.
However, when some of the chief concerns of the justices themselves
are examined, it becomes apparent that certain structural changes
are possible which could lead to vast improvement in the functioning
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Many of the issues considered herein engender well-supported
but diverse viewpoints. This Project does not purport to present all
sides but rather to relay some of the various arguments to which the
interviewers have been exposed in the hope that dialogue and debate
will be generated with respect to possible changes, and that
understanding will be enhanced.
This Project consists of two parts. Part I contains an historical
and structural account of the Supreme Court to provide a context for
the views of the justices. Part II focuses on the perceptions and
perspectives of the justices concerning various aspects of the
Supreme Court and court system in Pennsylvania.

have an accompanying opinion to explain it. A suspicious taxpayer might
logically infer that the Supreme Court, and many of the lesser tribunals in
Pennsylvania, don't always put in a full day's work.
Ecenbarger, the State Judiciary is "more equal," Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 23, 1978,
§ A, at 7, col. 2. In a later editorial in the same newspaper, the lack of adequate
dissemination of information was vehemently criticized:
[The Court) is a disgrace of maladministration, a swamp of self-protective
secrecy, a chaos of indifference to the needs of private citizens and the legal
community alike.
Secrecy prevails over the court's entire operation. Little information is
provided to the public about the court's administration, its backlog or the
performances of individual justices.
The Supreme disgrace:Pennsylvania's top court, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 19, 1978,
§L, at 6, col. 2.
The legislature may be somewhat hampered in its ability to act by the fact
that several of the justices feel restrained in presenting their opinions to the
legislature. In their view, the doctrine of the separation of powers renders it
inappropriate for the justices themselves to take their case to the legislative branch.
Interviews with the Justices.
Justices Manderino and Pomeroy, however, expressed a desire for increased
interaction between the court and the legislature to discuss their common concerns.
Interview with Justice Manderino (Nov. 15, 1977); Interview with Justice Pomeroy
(Nov. 17, 1977).
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PART I
The Development and Structure of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
I. THE COURT IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES
The "Supream Court" of Pennsylvania, as it was called in its
establishing Act of 1722,6 consisted of three justices 7 and was
empowered to issue "writs of habeas corpus, certiorari,and writs of
error, and all remedial and other writs and process."8 The concept of
limiting a high court strictly to an appellate review function was
foreign to the colonial province's orientation; the Supreme Court
served as the superior trial court 9 and retained the power to remove
cases from lower courts for trial through the issuance of writs of
certiorari. 10 The judges of the high court were also charged with the
duty of trying capital offenses" in their capacity as judges of oyer
and terminer and general gaol delivery. 12 The Act of 1722 also
allocated an appellate function to the Supreme Court by giving it the
authority to "examine and correct all manner of errors of the
Justices and Magistrates of this province, in their judgments,
process and proceedings."' l3 Cases could also be brought up by
various writs including the writs of error, certiorari, and habeas
14
corpus.

6. Act of May 22, 1722, ch. 255, § 11, 1 SMITH'S LAWS 131. See Surrency, The
Court's Place in History, 43 PA. B.A.Q. 440, 441 (1972).
7. Act of May 22, 1722, ch. 255, § 11, 1 SMITH'S LAWS 131. The justices were to be
"of known integrity and ability, commissionated by the Governor, or his Lieutenant
for the time being . . . under the great seal of this province." Id.

8. Id.
9. A statute was adopted by the colonial legislature in Pennsylvania in 1727 that
prohibited the issuance of any original process by the Supreme Court. See Act of Aug.
27, 1727, ch. 298, § 8, 4 PA. STAT. 84; Surrency, supra note 6, at 442. The statute was
disallowed by the Privy Council in England which had the power to repeal colonial
legislation. See 4 PA. STAT. 421, App. VIII, § 1. The statute was revived by the
Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1731 and was not further acted upon by the
Crown. See Act of Nov. 27, 1731, ch. 327, 4 PA. STAT. 229.
10. See Surrency, supra note 6, at 442.
11. See id. at 443. The justices of the Supreme Court remained triers of serious
criminal cases until the task was delegated to the judges of the Court of Common
Pleas by the constitution of 1790. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 5, § 5. It is interesting that
at least one contemporary Supreme Court justice, while in favor of relieving the high
court of direct appeals in felonious homicide cases, maintains that the Court should
retain its direct appeal function in capital offenses. See text following note 200 infra.
12. See Surrency, supra note 6, at 443, citing J. B. LINN, CHARTER TO WILLIAM
PENN AND THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA...
1682-1700, 392 (1879).
13. Act of May 22, 1722, ch. 255, § 13, 1 SMITH'S LAWS 131.
14. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra. The 1722 Act gave any two judges of
the Supreme Court the power to hold court and "hear and determine all manner of
pleas, plaints and causes, which shall be removed or brought there from the respective

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/3

4

Poul and Wallner: The Pennsylvania Project - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Perspe

1977-1978]

1045

PROJECT

The earliest legislative mandate requiring the Supreme Court to
travel from Philadelphia, the capital of Pennsylvania at that time, is
found in the Act of 1767 by which the Court was directed and
"enjoined, if occasion require[d], to go the circuit twice in every year,
into the several counties within this province."'1 5 The structure and
jurisdiction of the Court was little affected by the Revolutionary
War, and the change in government that resulted. The Act of 1777
specifically incorporated the Judiciary Act of 1722 and the circuitriding mandate of the Act of 1767.16
In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the Court
underwent a number of expansions of its jurisdictional powers. The
expansions included appeals from decisions of the Comptroller
General settling accounts due to the Commonwealth, 17 and the
18
authority to supply any defects in deeds.
Under the Act of 1786, the Court was given concurrent civil trial
jurisdiction with the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. 19 This
2
expanded trial function continued until the constitution of 1873. 0
The Act of 1799 established circuit courts for trials in the counties
and required that one or more justices sit in each circuit two times a
year. 21 The creation of circuit courts relieved the Court of its
burdensome en banc trial function in the counties by giving the
22
justices on circuit full power to render judgments and pass decrees.

General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, and Courts of Common Pleas ... of
Philadelphia, Chester and Bucks [counties] by virtue of any of the said writs." Act of
May 22, 1722, ch. 255, § 13, 1 SMITH'S LAWS 131.
15. Act of May 20, 1767, ch. 560, § 1, 1 SMrrH's LAws 274. This statute repealed the
portion of an earlier act that required the Court to sit in Chester and Bucks counties
on specific dates. See Act of May 22, 1722, ch. 255, § 12, 1 SMITH'S LAws 131. The
legislature thought it necessary to "enjoin" the Court to ride circuit twice a year
because "a practice has been introduced of trying all issues in fact.., at the city of
Philadelphia, which has often obliged the parties, jurymen and witnesses, to attend
from the most remote parts of the province..

.

to their very great, and unnecessary

expense and aggrievance." Act of May 20, 1767, ch. 560, § 1, 1 SMITH'S LAWS 274.
16. Act of Jan. 28, 1777, ch. 726, § 4, 1 SMITH'S LAws 429. The act was prefaced as
"[aln ACT to revive and put in force such and so much of the late laws of the province
of Pennsylvania, as is judged necessary to be in force in this commonwealth, and to
revive and establish the Courts of Justice .

. . ."

Id. (preamble).

17. Act of Feb. 18, 1785, ch. 1133, § 1, 11 PA. STAT. 435. "This was the first
administrative appeal authorized by statute in the state." Surrency, supra note 6, at
446.
18. Act of Mar. 28, 1786, ch. 1221, § 1, 12 PA. STAT. 216.
19. Act of Sept. 25, 1786, ch. 1246, § 3, 12 PA. STAT. 308.
20. See PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 5, § 3.
21. Act of Mar. 20, 1799, ch. 2032, §§ 1, 2, 16 PA. STAT. 199. See Surrency, supra
note 6, at 448.
22. See Surrency, supra note 6, at 448-49.
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The circuit courts were suspended in 1809,23 reestablished in 1826,24

and abolished in 1834.25 Once it was relieved of its circuit court
duties, the Supreme Court became, with one exception, solely a court
of judicial review. The exception was for Philadelphia, where
members of the Court continued to sit on courts of Nisi Prius 26 until
1874.27

The suspension and final abolition of the circuit courts did not
completely free the Court from the rigors of statewide travel. 28 The
Acts of 1806 and 1834 established the peripatetic responsibilities of
the Supreme Court in its appellate role. Under the 1806 Act, the
Court was to hold one appellate term in Pittsburgh and two in
Philadelphia. 29 Harrisburg, which became the capital of the
Commonwealth in 1812, was added as a seat in 1834. 30 This tri-city
duty continues to the present day. 31
The enlargement to a seven justice Court was effected in the
constitution of 1873.32 This constitution gave the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over the entire state and original jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to courts of inferior
jurisdiction and the writ of quo warranto to all commonwealth
officers whose authority extended throughout the state. 33 The
appellate jurisdiction of the Court was to be exercised by means of
appeal, certiorari, or the writ of error "in all cases, as is now or may
' 34
hereafter be provided by law.
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw a great increase in
the workload of the Court. 35 To relieve this burden, in 1895 the
legislature created the Superior Court 36 which was to function as an
intermediate appellate court. 37 The size of the Superior Court was
23. Act of Mar. 11, 1809, ch. 3043, § 5, 18 PA. STAT. 962.
24. Act of Apr. 8, 1826, ch. 88, 1825/26 Pa. Laws 263.
25. Act of Apr. 14, 1834, 1833/34 Pa. Laws 341.
26. Act of Apr. 14, 1834, §§ 16, 17, 1833/34 Pa. Laws 341. This provision was
carried over from an earlier act which provided that "no issues in fact in the Supreme
Court shall be tried in bank; but all issues of fact in causes then pending in the said
Supreme Court, shall be tried at courts of Nisi Prius, to be held in the city of
Philadelphia." Act of Feb. 24, 1806, ch. 2634, § 1, 4 SMITH'S LAws 270.
27. PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 5, § 3 (effective 1874).
28. See notes 135-41 and accompanying text infra.
29. See Act of Feb. 24, 1806, ch. 2634, § 4, 4 SMITH's LAws 270.
30. Act of Apr. 14, 1834, § 5, 1833/34 Pa. Laws 341.
31. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
32. PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 5, § 1. The Court originally consisted of three justices.
See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
33. PA. CONST. of 1873, art 5, § 3.
34. Id.
35. Surrency, supra note 3, at 189.
36. See note 68 infra.
37. Act of June 24, 1895, 1895 Pa. Laws 212. See note 69 and accompanying text
infra.
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later set at seven in the constitution. 38 The jurisdiction of the
Superior Court included final jurisdiction in "all actions, claims, and
disputes of every kind" where the amount in controversy was not
greater than $1,000.00.

II.

39

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM

A.

The System Prior to 1968
A great variety of independent courts grew out of the early
common law courts in Pennsylvania. 40 These courts were retained by
the constitution of 1873 and hence enjoyed constitutional immunity
against abolition or basic reorganization. By the early twentieth
century, in addition to constitutional courts, there were a large
number of courts created by legislation, such as the Superior Court, 41
the Juvenile Court, the Allegheny County Court, and the Municipal
Court of Philadelphia, which had extensive civil, criminal, and
domestic relations jurisdiction. 42 This nonsystematic growth of
Pennsylvania's judiciary took place during a period in which the
population of Pennsylvania more than doubled 43 with a parallel
increase in the number of cases. The resulting pressure on the
established structure produced the same type of fragmented and
inefficient court operation that had prompted Dean Roscoe Pound to
44
call for the institution of unified state court systems.
The situation in Pennsylvania, prior to the 1968 amendment to
the judiciary article of the constitution, 45 had deteriorated into
disorganization. Specifically, each of the sixty-six counties of the
commonwealth operated its own court system, had its own budget
38. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
39. Act of June 24, 1895, § 7(c), 1895 Pa. Laws 212. The jurisdictional amount has
gradually been raised to $10,000. Act of Aug. 14, 1963, § 2, 1963 Pa. Laws 819.
40. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 143.
41. See note 68 infra.
42. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 1-2.
43. The population of the state grew from 3,521,951 in 1870 to 8,720,017 in 1920. 17
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA 568, 569 (1971).
44. See R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940). In this classic treatise on
judicial reform in America, Dean Pound observed that the physical and economic
conditions in pioneer America, along with the rapid growth of urban areas, resulted in
the proliferation of local courts which failed to be organized under a responsible
administrative head. Id. at 256. State courts that had concurrent and overlapping
jurisdiction were increasingly confronted with the problem of undoing each others'
work. Id. In response to these unsatisfactory conditions, Dean Pound formulated the
idea that the whole judicial power of each state be vested in "one great court," of
which all tribunals would be branches, departments, or divisions. Id. at 273-74. The
business, as well as the judicial administration of the court, would, according to Dean
Pound, be thoroughly organized "so as to prevent not merely waste of judicial power,
but all needless clerical work, duplication of papers and records, and the like, thus
obviating expense to litigants and cost to the public." Id. at 274.
45. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text infra.
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and exercised complete autonomy. 46 There was no central agency or
court to supervise the judicial business of the commonwealth. 47 No
provision existed for a court administrator or similar office to assist
the judges in the purely operational functions of the judicial
system. 48 In addition, the existing constitution and statutes created

overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction. 49 Significant demands for
judicial reform in Pennsylvania in the early 1960's 50 culminated in
the calling of a limited constitutional convention in 1968 and the
repeal of the old 5 ' and the adoption of a new judiciary article.52 The
new article created a unified judicial system5 3 with the Supreme
54
Court at its head.

46. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. For example, in both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh there was overlapping and
coordinate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters. See generally S.
SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 140 n.4.
50. One commentator, Sidney Schulman, introduced his study in court reorganization with this criticism of the state of the judiciary:
Our present judicial system in Pennsylvania suffers from a number of
major deficiencies: (1) Structural deficiencies in the organization of its courts;
(2) An outmoded, archaic minor court system; (3) Lack of efficient supervision and administration over the non-judicial aspects of the business of the
courts; (4) Inefficient use of judicial personnel; (5) A system of selection of
judges which has made them dependent on political leaders for their
appointment, election and continuance in office; (6) An antiquated system of
discipline of judges which uses tools inadequate to the task - namely
impeachment and address - and (7) the lack of an integrated Bar.
S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 1. See also REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 93 (1964). See generally Freedman, The Organization
of a New Judicial Structure for Pennsylvania, 35 TEMP. L. Q. 373 (1962).
In recommending that a constitutional amendment would better remedy the
deficiencies of the Pennsylvania judicial system than legislative action, Schulman
noted a number of constitutional "roadblocks" to a legislative solution including the
detailed provisions for the creation of separated courts, the detailed provision for
creation of separated judicial districts based on arbitrary population figures rather
than need, the detailed provisions for the selection of presiding judges by seniority
rather than ability, and the difficulties of reorganization imposed by the uniformity
clause of the constitution. S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
51. Proposal No. 7, adopted by the Constitutional Convention, and approved by
the electorate on Apr. 23, 1968, provides in § 1 as follows: "Article five of the
Constitution of Pennsylvania is repealed in its entirety, and those provisions of
Schedules No. 1 and No. 2 (at end of constitution) are repealed to the extent they are
inconsistent with this Article and attached Schedule." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 1 (historical
note).
52. PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1- 18.
53. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides in part: "The judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme
Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court ... [and] such other Courts as
may be provided by law and justices of the peace." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
54. The constitution as amended provides: "The Supreme Court (a) shall be the
highest court of the Commonwealth and in this Court shall be reposed the supreme
judicial power of the Commonwealth; (b) Shall consist of seven justices, one of whom
shall be the Chief Justice; and (c) Shall have jurisdiction as shall be provided by
law." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 2.
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The Unified Sy8tem

The unified statewide court system was created in Pennsylvania
to unify, integrate, and simplify the court structure.5 5 Instead of
instituting the "one great court" idea proposed by Dean Pound,5 6 the
new judicial article put the Supreme Court at the apex of the court
system5 7 and gave that Court broad rulemaking powers to govern
58
the practice, procedure, and conduct of all courts in the state.
Prior to the 1968 amendment, the Supreme Court had rulemaking power over civil procedure of courts of record, but not over the
minor court system, or over appellate procedure for appeals to
itself.5 9 The Court had shared power to make rules of criminal
procedure with the Superior Court.6° Two legislative acts - the Act
of 172261 and the Civil Procedural Rules Act of 193762 - had given
the Supreme Court extensive rulemaking power,6 3 but the power was
never fully explored or utilized, perhaps because of the Court's
reluctance to abuse a legislatively delegated function and its belief

55. See generally S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 146-69.
56. See note 44 supra; S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 142, citing R. POUND,
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 273 (1940).

57. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 2. For the text of this section, see note 54 supra.
58. PA. CONST. art. 5, §10. Section 10(c) establishes the Supreme Court's
rulemaking powers as follows:
(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts... including the
power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or
classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall
require . ..if such rules are consistent with the Constitution and neither
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant ....
Id. § 10(c).
For a description of the reorganization of the lower courts of the state under
the new judiciary article, see Comisky & Krestal, Analysis of New JudiciaryArticle,
40 PA. B.A.Q. 68 (1968).
59. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 149-50. Pursuant to its broadened
rulemaking power, the Court has promulgated rules of appellate procedure. See PA. R.
App. P.
60. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 150, 153.
61. Act of May 22, 1722, ch. 255, 1 SMrrH'S LAws 131. This act presumably gave
the Court the same supervisory powers enjoyed by the English common law courts of
King's Bench. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 150. According to Schulman:
This King's Bench power has been assumed by some to be the basis of the
Court's inherent rule-making and supervisory power, but it is, in fact, no more
than a legislative delegation, and the extent of the Supreme Court's inherent
rule-making power and the conflict between judicial supremacy and
legislative control has never been fully determined in Pennsylvania.
S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 150.
62. Act of June 21, 1937, 1937 Pa. Laws 1982, as amended by Act of Aug. 25, 1959,
1959 Pa. Laws 751 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 61 (Purdon 1962)).
63. See note 61 supra.
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that the legislature and local courts were better equipped to solve
64
local problems of congestion and delay.
Constitutional delegation of the rulemaking power under sections
10(a) and 10(c) 6 5 of the 1968 constitutional amendment gave the
Court the broad authority necessary to manage the new unified court
system. One notable example of the use of section 10(c) as a
workload management tool was the Court's delegation of its equity
jurisdiction to the Superior Court in 1975.66 Section 10(b) provided for
the appointment of a court administrator to coordinate the business
67
of the Court.
In order to facilitate further the unified court system plan in
Pennsylvania, the adoption of the new judicial article in 1968
invested the Superior Court 66 as a constitutional court consisting of
seven judges with its jurisdiction to be provided by law 69 and created
a Commonwealth Court with both its jurisdiction and the number of
judges to be provided by law. 70
64. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 150-51. Schulman noted in his 1962 study
of the Pennsylvania judicial system that the Court was content with legislative
delegation of rulemaking authority except in connection with the admission and
discipline of attorneys. In that area, whose regulation the Court considers an inherent
and not derivative judicial function, the Court has refused to be bound by legislation
not consonant with its rules. He observed that "[i]n all other respects, [the Supreme
Court's] rule-making power is a delegated one which can be revoked by the
Legislature or nibbled away piecemeal by legislation inconsistent with the rules." Id.
at 149.
65. See note 58 supra.
66. See 5 PA. BULL. 103 (1975). Former rule 73 of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Rules was promulgated on Jan. 7, 1975 and effective on Apr. 17, 1975. The rule was
incorporated into the rules of appellate procedure with no change in substance. See
PA. R. App. P. 702(b) (note); note 202 and accompanying text infra.
67. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(b) provides: "The Supreme Court shall appoint a court
administrator and may appoint such subordinate administrators and staff as may be
necessary and proper for the prompt and proper disposition of the business of all
courts and justices of the peace."
68. The Superior Court had been created in 1895 by an act which provided:
[A] court of intermediate appeal is hereby established to be called The
Superior Court, and to be composed of seven judges learned in the law, who
shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State, except as they may be
appointed by the Governor under the provisions of this act.
Act of June 24, 1895, 1895 Pa. Laws 212. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
69. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "The Superior Court shall consist of
seven judges, one of whom shall be the president judge, and it's jurisdiction shall be
as provided by law." PA. CONST. art 5, § 3. The Superior Court was created to relieve
the Supreme Court of the intolerable burden of appeals. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note
3, at 153-54.
The jurisdiction of the Superior Court was prescribed by the Appellate Court
Jurisdiction Act of 1970. Act No. 223, 1970 Pa. Laws 673 (codified at 42 PA. C.S.A.
§ 761 (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)). See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
70. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 4. On Jan. 6, 1970, the legislature passed the Commonwealth Court Act which provides:
[A] court of record of statewide original and appellate jurisdiction, to be
known as the Commonwealth Court, is established to be composed of seven
judges who shall be citizens of the Commonwealth and members of the bar of
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The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970

The 1968 amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution established a framework for a reformed judiciary. The Appellate Court
Jurisdiction Act (ACJA)71 was enacted on July 31, 1970 by the
General Assembly to give substance and detail to the new judical
article.
The ACJA gave the Supreme Court original, 72 but not exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases of habeas corpus, 73 mandamus or
prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction, 74 and quo warranto as to
any commonwealth officer with statewide jurisdiction. 75 The direct
appeal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was made to include
appeals from final orders of the Courts of Common Pleas in the
following cases: felonious homicide; 76 right to public office; 77 matters
decided in the Orphans' Court division; 78 actions or proceedings in
equity other than those delegated to the Commonwealth Court or
elsewhere pursuant to statute; 79 direct criminal contempt in the
Court of Common Pleas and other contempt proceedings in the Court

the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth and who shall, for a period of one
year preceding their election or appointment and during their continuance in
office, reside within the Commonwealth.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 211.2 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). For a historical resume
of the Commonwealth Court, see Comisky, Commonwealth Court Investiture, 42 PA.
B.A.Q. 25 (1970). See also Comment, The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania:
Jurisdiction and JurisdictionalQuestions, 47 TEMP. L. Q. 86 (1973).
71. Act No. 223, 1970 Pa. Laws 673.
72. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 721 (Purdon Pamphlet 1977) provides: "The
Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All cases of
habeas corpus; (2) All cases of mandamus or prohibition to courts of inferior
jurisdiction; (3) All cases of quo warranto as to any officer of statewide jurisdiction."
Id.
The ACJA's grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court failed to
conform to recommendations put forward by at least two quarters. The American Bar
Association recommended in its Draft of a Model Judiciary Article for State
Constitutions that a Supreme Court be given no original jurisdiction and that it only
be permitted to issue writs necessary or appropriate to its appellate function. ABA
MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE, § 2, 2(A) (1962). The reasoning behind the ABA's
suggestion was that original jurisdiction involves fact-finding tasks which are
inappropriate for a high court. Id. The validity of this argument has been challenged.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 473. In addition, Sidney Schulman's study suggested
that the Court be given no original jurisdiction so that the Court would be able to
regulate its caseload in accordance with the needs of the times. See S. SCHULMAN,
supra note 3, at 8.
73. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 721(1) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
74. Id. § 721(2).
75. Id. § 721(3).
76. Id. § 722(1).
77. Id. § 722(2).
78. Id. § 722(3).
79. Act of July 31, 1970, § 202(4), 1970 Pa. Laws 673. This section was dispensed
with when the Supreme Court through its rulemaking power delegated its equity
jurisdiction to that court. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
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of Common Pleas relating to orders that are appealable directly to
the Supreme Court; s° suspension or disbarment from the practice of
law;8 ' supersession of a district attorney by an attorney general or
by a court;8 2 matters where the right or power of the commonwealth
or any political subdivision to create or issue indebtedness is drawn
in direct question;8 3 and matters
where the court of common pleas has held invalid as repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or to
the Constitution of this Commonwealth, any treaty or law of the
United States or any provision of the Constitution of, or of any
act of Assembly of, this Commonwealth, or any provision of any
home rule charter.8 4
The Supreme Court was given exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from
all final orders of the Commonwealth Court in matters that were
originally commenced in the Commonwealth Court and that were
not an appeal to that court,8 5 as well as appeals from orders of the
Commonwealth Court in cases that were appealed to that court from
the Board of Finance and Revenue.8 6 Finally, the Supreme Court
was given allocatur, i.e., permissive jurisdiction"7 upon allowance of
appeal by any two of the seven justices.88
The ACJA relieved the Supreme Court of direct appeals in
assumpsit and trespass matters by delegating such matters to the
Superior Court. 89 The Superior Court was given exclusive appellate

80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(4) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).

81. Id. § 722(8). Provision is also made for direct appeal from Common Pleas
Court decisions concerning other disciplinary orders or sanctions relating to the
practice of law. Id.
82. Id. § 722(5).
83. Id. § 722(6).
84. Id. § 722(7).
85. Id. § 723.
86. Id.
87. The nature, function and scope of allocatur jurisdiction is set out in the
Pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure. PA. R. App. P. 1112-1123. An appeal may
be taken from any final order of the Commonwealth Court which is not an appeal as
of right from the Commonwealth Court, or from any final order of the Superior Court.
As a general rule, a petition must be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court
within thirty days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court or Commonwealth
Court sought to be reviewed. Under rule 1114, review of a final order "is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and an appeal will be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor." PA. R. App. P. 1112.
For a discussion of the manner in which the petitions are handled by the
Pennsylvania justices, see note 181 infra.
88. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 723(9) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
A similar provision had appeared in 1895 Pa. Laws 212, but had required the
allowance of only one justice. Id. § 7(c).
89. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 742 (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
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jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the Common Pleas
Court regardless of the nature of the controversy or the amount
involved. 90 The Superior Court was given no original jurisdiction by
the ACJA except in actions of mandamus and prohibition to courts
of inferior jurisdiction where the actions are ancillary to matters
within its appellate jurisdiction. 91
Even though the enactment of the ACJA in 1970 increased the
Superior Court's jurisdiction by adding assumpsit and trespass
cases, that court was relieved of its former jurisdiction involving
appeals from state and local administrative agencies divisions. The
ACJA transferred these appeals to the Commonwealth Court 92 and
gave this new court original jurisdiction over all civil actions against
the commonwealth or any of its officers acting in their official
capacity, except 1) proceedings under the Eminent Domain Code and
2) "actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of
habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings
within the appellate jurisdiction of the court. ' 93 In addition, the
Commonwealth Court was given direct exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from administrative agencies of the commonwealth, with several exceptions. 94 In general, all matters involving
local government, home rule charters or ordinances and criminal
violations thereof became appealable to the Commonwealth Court
under the ACJA, 95 except those matters involving the right of the
commonwealth in a political subdivision to create or issue indebted96
ness which were made directly appealable to the Supreme Court.
D.

Administrative Duties

The Supreme Court, in its capacity as overseer of the unified
court system, 97 has various administrative responsibilities which

90. Id.
91. Id. § 741. For a discussion of the statutory and constitutional origins of the
Superior Court, see notes 35-39 & 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
92. The Commonwealth Court was created by the 1968 revision of the judicial
article. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
93. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761(a)(1)(i) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
94. Id. § 763. The exceptions include appeals from revocation or suspension of
motor vehicle operators' licenses, Liquor Code appeals, and Workmen's Compensation, which go first to the Common Pleas Courts and then to the Commonwealth
Court. Id. § 763(1).
95. Id. §762(4).
96. Id. § 722(6).
97. The Supreme Court is endowed with "general supervisory and administrative
authority" over the court system in Pennsylvania by § 10(a) of the Judiciary Article,
which provides: "The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and
administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace, including the
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occupy the time of the justices. 98 The power granted in the
constitution to promulgate "rules governing practice, procedure and
conduct of all courts" 99 is the vehicle by which the Court
administers, supervises, and manages the court system in Pennsylvania.
As head of the unified court system, the Court exercises
authority over all courts in the system, as well as numerous
magistrates and justices of tha peace. 100 The court administrator,01 1
appointed by the Court, is also subject to the Court's direction, 10 2 as
are the system's support personnel such as the prothonotaries. 1 3
Additionally, the budget of the system requires the attention and
10 4
approval of the Court.
A court system the size of Pennsylvania's necessarily requires a
panoply of rules' 05 to enable both the courts and system alike to
function effectively. Thus the Court has appointed and presides over
nine rules advisory committees, 0 6 and has enacted, inter alia, rules

authority to temporarily assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or
district as it deems appropriate. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(a).

In § 10(b) of the same article, the Court is given the responsibility to appoint
the necessary and proper administrative personnel to run the business of the court
system. For the text of § 10(b), see note 67 supra.
98. See note 4 supra; text accompanying notes 181-84 infra.
99. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c). For the text of this section, see note 58 and
accompanying text supra.
100. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10.
101. The first responsibility assigned to the Court Administrator by the Supreme
Court was to take charge of the reorganization of the courts of initial jurisdiction of
the state. See Meyer, supra note 3, at 465. This need for reorganization was
precipitated by the substantial reforms brought about by the constitutional revision.
Id. Beginning in 1970, the administrative office started issuing annual statistical
reports - reports which made possible, for the first time, intelligent appraisal of the
caseloads of the courts, the state of delay and congestion, and the trend in case
inventory. Id. at 472-73. The prothonotary - not the court administrator - keeps
statistics on the Supreme Court. See note 289 infra.
The Court Administrator's assigned responsibilities also include serving,
since 1973, as secretariat for the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges;
devising a system for reimbursement and disbursement of funds appropriated by the
state legislature to compensate counties for costs incurred by each county in the
administration and operation of its courts; surveying and studying the auditing of
financial transactions connected with the courts of the Commonwealth except for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court; and establishing a liaison with legislative leaders. In
connection with this last duty, the Administrative Office regularly reviews all bills
introduced in the legislature that may affect the judicial system. The general
functions of the Administrative Office are set out in PA. R. JUD. ADM. 504.
102. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(b). For the text of § 10(b), see note 67 supra. See PA. R.
JUD. ADM. 501, 504.

103. See note 139 supra; note 289 infra.
104. Carrol v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1975).

105. For a list of the rules enacted by the Court, see note 259 infra.
106. See PA. RULES OF COURT at XV-XVIII (West Pamphlet 1977).
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prescribing how the system is to be administered, rules establishing
the practice and procedure for the various courts in the system, and
codes of conduct for judges and lawyers. In addition to the
procedural rules committees, the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board, 0 7 the Judicial Council of Pennsylvania,'" and the Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania' °9 are under the aegis of the Court,
along with the State Board of Law Examiners." 0
III.

JUDICIAL SELECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA

Judges in Pennsylvania are selected in one of two ways - by2
popular election,"' or, in the case of a vacancy, by appointment."
Justices of the Supreme Court serve ten year terms" 3 and may be
reelected at the conclusion of each term. 1 4 Judges of the intermediate appellate courts and the lower courts also serve ten year
terms 1 5 followed by retention elections. 1 6 Any justice or judge who
is seated pursuant to interim appointment may, at the conclusion of
his or her term of office, file7 a declaration of candidacy and seek
retention by the electorate."

PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
108. PA. R. JUD. ADM. 301.

107.

109. PA. R. SuP. CT. 205.
110. PA. R. SuP. CT. 7.

111. The constitution provides: "Justices, judges, and justices of the peace shall be
elected at the municipal election . . . by the electors of the Commonwealth or the
respective districts in which they are to serve." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13(a).
112. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13(b). See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
113. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 15(a).
114. Id. § 15(b).
115. Id. § 15(a).
116. Id. § 15(b).
117. Id.
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The present system of judicial selection in Pennsylvania has an
unsettled past and an uncertain future. 118 The call 1 9 for overall

118. This unsettled past parallels the changing attitudes toward judicial selection
throughout American history. For a discussion of the history of judicial selection
processes in the United States, see A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL
MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 7-11 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
ASHMAN & ALFINI]; Nelson, Variations on a Theme - Selection and Tenure of
Judges, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4 (1962); Winters, Selection of Judges - An Historical
Introduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1966).
In colonial Pennsylvania, as in colonial America, judges were usually
appointed by the governor. See Keefe, Judges and Politics: The Pennsylvania Plan of
Judicial Selection, 20 U. PIr. L. REv. 621 (1959).
Under the never-ratified Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which was
drafted at the suggestion of the Continental Congress, the Supreme Executive Council
- an elected body - appointed the various judges of the various courts of record. PA.
CONST. of 1776, §§ 19, 20. See LEGIS. REF. BUREAU, CONSTITUTIONS OF PA. AND THE
U.S. 219-39 (1916). The constitution of 1790 transferred the appointment power to the
governor. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. 2, § 8.
The demand for an elective system came later in the commonwealth's history
- undoubtedly in response to the wave of Jacksonian Democracy, which swept the
country in the 1830's, and was characterized by a violent swing towards the
democratization of government which was to be implemented through the power of
the ballot box. Arensberg, Election of Judges - 1850 Style, 38 PA. B.A.Q. 56, 57 (1966).
The elective system was adopted by constitutional amendment in 1850. PA. CONST. of
1838, amend. 1850, art. 5, § 2. This proved to be impregnable to the major assaults on
the popular election system in the early twentieth century. See ASHMAN & ALFINI,
supra, at 10-11.
Opponents of the elective system argued that the elective system diminished
the freedom of the judiciary from political pressures by interest groups and party
organization. See Keefe, supra, at 622. Abuses in the elective system sparked a
national movement for progressive judicial administration at the turn of the century.
One of the major assaults on the popular election system came from then University
of Nebraska law professor, Roscoe Pound, who noted that popular judicial elections
were a major cause of public dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Pound,
The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprinted
in 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 55, 66 (1962). Pound's assault on popular elections was carried
on by William Howard Taft, the ex-President of the United States and future Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra, at 10. In response to
Pound's criticisms, Albert M. Kales proposed a plan - the Kales Plan - for a system
of judicial selection which consisted of the appointment of judges by an elected chief
justice from a list of names submitted by an impartial nonpartisan nominating body.
Under the Kales Plan, judges would be required to go before the voters on the sole
question of their retention. See Nelson, supra, at 17, 18; Winters, supra, at 1084. The
Kales Plan was amended in 1926 by political scientist Harold Laski who proposed
that the Governor be substituted for the chief justice as the appointing agent.
ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra, at 11. This Kales-Laski proposal became the prototype for
many subsequent judicial plans and was endorsed by the American Bar Association
in 1937. Id. The well-known "Missouri Plan" was the first such plan to be adopted
when it was added to Missouri's constitution in 1940. Mo. CONST. of 1875, amend.
1940, § 1. Section 29(a) of the current Missouri constitution provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of judge of any of the following
courts of this state, to wit: The supreme court [and] the courts of appeals... .
the governor shall fill such vacancies by appointing one of three persons
possessing the qualifications for such office, who shall be nominated and
whose names shall be submitted to the governor by a nonpartisan judicial
commission established and organized as hereinafter provided.
Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 29(a). For a discussion of the Missouri nonpartisan plan, see
Bundschu, The Missouri Non-PartisanCourt Plan, 16 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 55 (1948);
Hall, Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 33 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 163 (1965); Rooks,
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judicial reform in the 1960's included severe criticisms of the manner
in which judges were selected and retained. 120 Virtually unchanged
since 1873, the constitution has provided for partisan election of
Supreme Court justices 121 and other judges, and the filling of
vacancies by appointment of the governor. 122 This system was
condemned by reformers as one that maximized irrelevant political
123
considerations and minimized meaningful judicial qualifications.
Missouri Court Plan; Judicial Selection and Tenure, 13 J. Mo. BAR 166 (1957);
Williamson, Nonpartisan Court Plan: Opposition View, 25 J. Mo. BAR 213 (1969).
In 1947, the Pennsylvania Bar Association endorsed a compromise method of
selection for vacancies based largely on the successful "Missouri Plan." See Keefe,
supra, at 623. The so-called "Pennsylvania Plan" sought to accommodate both the
appointment and election principles into a single plan by combining popular control
with merit selection. Id. at 622. Under that plan, the governor would be empowered to
fill vacancies on the Supreme Court, Superior Court and courts of record of
Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties by appointment, but the governor's choice
would be restricted to a panel of persons nominated by a nonpartisan judicial
selection commission consisting of seven members. Id. at 622-23. The commission
would be composed of one judge who would be selected by a plan formulated by the
Supreme Court, three lawyers and three lay citizens appointed by the governor. Id. at
623.
Under the Pennsylvania Plan, the governor would have the power to reject
the panels of nominees and demand new panels until he made the final appointment
- a concession made under the Pennsylvania Plan to accommodate political parties
and the prerogatives of the governor. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 50. After
appointment, the judge or justice would serve a full term at which time he or she
would file a notice of intention to seek reelection. Id. at 49. The judge's name would
then appear on a separate judicial ballot at the next election for confirmation or
rejection by the voters. Id.
Legislative proposals that would have led to a constitutional amendment
implementing the Pennsylvania Plan were repeatedly unsuccessful. See Keefe, supra,
at 623. In 1959, the Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision stated:
This type of voting is foreign to us; it is a procedure copied from a
different type of 'democracy.' However, it is reasonable to assume there would
be virtually no rejections [of judges on retention ballot]. Where officials are
'elected' on a 'yes' or 'no' vote, approval is nearly unanimous. You cannot lick
somebody with nobody is a tried and accepted political slogan even in
America.
S. SCHULMAN, supra note
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

3, at 53 n.68, quoting

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

215 (1959).

119. See note 118 supra.

120. See generally S.

SCHULMAN, supra note 3,at 18-58.
121. The 1873 constitution provided that the Supreme Court judges should "be
elected by the qualified electors of the State at large." PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 5, § 2
(historical note).
122. PA. CONST. of 1873, art. 5, § 25 provided that "[a]ny vacancy happening by
death, resignation or otherwise, in any court of record, shall be filled by appointment
by the Governor." Id. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 18. In his study on court
reorganization, Schulman stated that "[u]nfortunately, our political traditions in
Pennsylvania have rarely exalted the judicial office above the grasp of the political
party spoils system and the pragmatic demands of political life." Id. at 22. He also
observed that the elective system had become, as of the time of his study, a
combination appointive-elective system, since the great majority of judges were
reaching the bench by interim appointment by the governor. Id. at 20. The governor's
increasing control concerned Schulman because "independent Governors sensitive to
the high needs of the judicial system are usually transitory." Id. at 21.
123. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 18.
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The limited constitutional convention of 1968 responded to such
criticism by recommending the adoption of a judicial selection plan
whereby the governor would select justices and judges from a list of
persons submitted by a judicial qualifications commission. 124 This
proposal was submitted to the voters in the May, 1969, primary
election, but was narrowly defeated.125 Thus, except for the filling of
vacancies 126 by gubernatorial appointment under the voluntary
Pennsylvania Plan, 27 partisan election is the present mode of
28
judicial selection in Pennsylvania.1
The Pennsylvania Plan, 129 which has thus far failed to find its
way into the state constitution, 30 has been implemented by

124. The proposed § 13(d) of article 5 was adopted by the convention on April 23,
1968. See PA. CONST., art. 5, § 13 (historical note). The section reads as follows:
(d) At the primary election in 1969, the electors of the Commonwealth
may elect to have the justices and judges of the Supreme, Superior,
Commonwealth and all other statewide courts appointed by the Governor
from a list of persons qualified for the offices submitted to him by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission. If a majority vote of those voting on the question
is in favor of this method of appointment, then whenever any vacancy occurs
thereafter for any reason in such Court, the Governor shall fill the vacancy by
appointment in the manner prescribed in this subsection. Such appointment
shall not require the consent of the Senate.
PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13(d) (proposed). The merit selection question, placed on the ballot
pursuant to a referendum provision in the 1968 Constitution, was unsuccessful. PA.
CONST. sched. art. 5, § 28.
The Judicial Qualifications Committee was to be composed of four non-lawyer
electors appointed by the governor and three non-judge members of the bar of the
Supreme Court appointed by the Supreme Court. No more than four members of the
commission could belong to the same political party and each member would serve a
term of seven years. PA. CONST., art. 5 § 14(a) (proposed).
125. See PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13 (historical note); text accompanying note 277 infra.
Interestingly, the plan rejected by the Pennsylvania voters in 1969 was somewhat
similar to the method of selection employed in the Commonwealth in the 18th century.
See note 121 supra.
126. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 118 supra.
128. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 13(a). For the text of this sections, see note 111 supra.
129. See note 118 supra.
130. See notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text supra; see also text accompanying note 278 infra. The plan nevertheless remained popular with a number of judicial
reformers in the state. See S. SCHULMAN, supra note 3, at 10. In 1964, the plan became
the official position of a citizens' group whose chairman was the present Supreme
Court Justice Thomas W. Pomeroy, Jr. See CITIZENS' CONFERENCE ON MODERNIZATION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE CONSENSUS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3 (1964).

The debate over judicial selection continues in Pennsylvania as it does in
other states. At one pole are those who would extend the merit selection plan to initial
selections and rid the state of partisan judicial selections completely. At the other pole
are those who contend that judicial accountability is possible only under an elective
system. A reconciliation may yet be found. The final goal, however, is as uncontested
today as it was in 1790 when John Jay opined, "Next to doing right, the great object in
the administration of public justice should be to give public satisfaction." Nejelski,
The Tension of Popular Participation,1 STATE COURT J. 9 (1977).
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executive order. 131 Under this voluntary plan, which provides for
vacancy appointments and retention by popular vote for appellate
and general trial courts, the governor appoints an Appellate Court
Nominating Commission 132 and a Trial Court Nominating Commission 133 "to assist the Governor in carrying out his desire and
intention to appoint to judicial office only those members of the Bar
who are, by virtue of their learning, experience, character and
34
temperament, best fitted therefor."'

IV.

THE PERIPATETIC COURT

In addition to the increased responsibilities imposed upon the
Supreme Court that result from the Court's stewardship of the new
unified court system, 135 the time of the justices is further consumed
by their continuing obligation to "ride the circuit.' 3 6 In 1977, the
Court held argument sessions in Philadelphia in January, April,
October and November; in Pittsburgh in March and September; and
in Harrisburg in May. 1 37 Most cases are heard in the district in
which they are filed except for felonious homicide cases and other
cases of special importance which are heard at the first argument
38
session after briefs are filed, without regard to district.
The Supreme Court maintains separate offices in each of their
three districts. Practically speaking, Harrisburg and Pittsburgh

131. Executive Order No. 1973-6, § 7.111 (as amended March 6, 1975), cited in 5 PA.
BULL. 711 (1975).
132. The Appellate Court Nominating Commission consists of three members of
the Bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; three lay persons and the Justice of
the Supreme Court "longest in continuous service and not eligible to file a declaration
of candidacy for retention election . . . to serve as Chairman." 5 PA. BULL. 711, 712
(1975).
133. Each trial court nominating commission consists of one area member who is a
member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and is actively practicing
law in the nominating area; one lay member and a third member who may be an
attorney or layman as the governor determines. Id.
134. Id. at 711.
135. See notes 55-76 & 97-110 supra.
136. As used here, "riding the circuit" refers to the fact that the Court travels
between three designated cities - Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Harrisburg - to hold
its sessions. Although the justices' duty to hear appeals in three different cities is
commonly known as "riding the circuit," it differs from the circuit riding done by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania from 1799-1809, and 1826-1834, when the Court
travelled to perform a general trial function. See notes 21-27 and accompanying text
supra.
Currently, Pennsylvania is divided by statute into districts in which the
Supreme Court sits. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 11, 12 (Purdon 1962). The Court is
statutorily empowered to adjust the districts and the court sessions there. Id. § 16. For
the justices' views of the peripatetic court, see notes 235-55 and accompanying text
infra.
137. PA. RULES OF COURT at ix (West Pamphlet 1977).
138. See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
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serve as suboffices and Philadelphia is considered the principal
office of the Court. 3 9 Individual justices do not, for the most part,
maintain their principal offices in Philadelphia. 140 Each resident
county of an appellate court judge is required by statute to supply an
office in the county and a majority of the judges use these facilities
141
as their principal offices.
PART II
Views from the Bench
This portion of the Project is a study of the Supreme Court as
perceived by the justices. The topics of discussion - excess caseload,
jurisdiction reform and its impediments, effects of the peripatetic
court, rulemaking, and judicial selection - were chosen as a result of
background research which suggested that these factors were most
interrelated with the Court's ability to provide prompt justice and
advance the development of the law, without sacrificing thorough
deliberation of the cases before it.142

I.

THE CASELOAD OF THE COURT

There is no disagreement among the justices with the proposition that the workload in general, and the caseload in particular, of
the Supreme Court is unrealistically heavy. 143 Justice Nix pointed

139. IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. The Supreme Court, pursuant to statute, is
authorized to appoint a separate prothonotary for each district. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 18 (Purdon 1962). See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. The current practice is that
one prothonotary is appointed as the Supreme Court Prothonotary who then appoints
a deputy prothonotary to each of the districts. See id. at 16. The Supreme Court
Prothonotary has many duties not directly connected with the appellate function
including: 1) preparation of the budget for the Supreme Court and for the
prothonotary's offices in Pittsburgh and Harrisburg; 2) preparation of the budget and
serving as treasurer of the State Reporter and various committees and boards
appointed by the Supreme Court such as the Civil and Criminal Procedure Rules
Committee, State Board of Bar Examiners, and several others; and 3) keeping special
dockets relating to civil and criminal rules, Supreme Court rules, and the business of
the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. Id. at 16-18.
Philadelphia maintains seven court personnel in addition to the deputy
prothonotary. Id. at 16. These seven persons are paid by the City of Philadelphia, but
are subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court Prothonotary. Id. at 17. In
Pittsburgh, the prothonotary staff is shared by the Supreme and Superior Courts; the
staff includes a deputy and four personnel, who handle the paperwork, recordkeeping
and financial work. Id. at 18. Harrisburg maintains one clerk in addition to the
deputy prothonotary. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id.
142. See note 4 supra.
143. Interviews with the Justices. All the justices used words such as "unquestionably" and "indubitably" when queried as to whether their caseload was too heavy.
See also Potter, supra note 1; note 204 infra.
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out that the jurisdiction in Pennsylvania far exceeds the comparable
jurisdiction of the highest courts in New York, New Jersey, and
14
California. "
One cause of the heavy casesload is the large number of direct
appeals which the Court must hear. 145 A more subtle source of the
excessive number of cases results from time constraints on the
Superior Court causing it to produce an inordinate amount of per
curiam affirmances or reversals. 146 This dearth of articulated
147
opinions inevitably results in more appeals to the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the proliferation of per curiam opinions 148 means that
the Superior Court is not functioning as a general law court in the
development and determination of law and precedent. 49 The
ensuing unpredictability and uncertainty of the law encourages and
requires lawyers to press appeals to the Supreme Court for a
determination of the law upon which their clients must base their
behavior. Thus, the Superior Court is often a mere way station along
the route to the Supreme Court, rather than a final stopping place.150
Justice Roberts indicated that for the past several years, the
members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have been assigned
more than twice, and in some cases more than three times, the
number of cases assigned to members of the highest courts of the

For a comparison of the caseload of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
recent caseloads of the New Jersey Supreme Court and the New York Court of
Appeals, see note 152 infra; Appendix infra.

144. Interview with Justice Nix (Nov. 28, 1977). For example, the New Jersey
Constitution provides the following jurisdictional scope for that state's highest court:
1. Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court:

(a) In causes determined by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States or

this State;
(b) In causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court;
(c) In capital causes;

(d) On certification by the Supreme Court to the Superior Court and,
where provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to the County Courts and the

inferior courts; and
(e) In such causes as may be provided by law.
N.J.

CONST.

art. 6, § 5. For the current jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

see notes 72-88 and accompanying text supra.
145. See note 171 and accompanying text infra.
146. Interviews with the Justices; interviews with the clerks. See also note 204
infra.

147. Interviews with the Justices; interviews with the clerks.
148. This practice generally has been condemned. See P.
MEADOR, & H. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL].

HARRINGTON, D.
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

149. For a discussion of the justices views on the proper role of the Supreme Court
and intermediate appellate courts, see notes 156-72 and accompanying text infra.

150. Interviews with the Justices; interviews with the clerks.
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most populous states. 151 He listed as examples New York, New
Jersey, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Massachusetts, Florida, Texas, and
Wisconsin,15 2 noting that the same comparison held true vis & vis the
151. Interview with Justice Roberts (Nov. 21, 1977). This may perhaps be linked to
the fact that Pennsylvania has the fewest intermediate appellate judges of the eight
largest states in the United States. See text accompanying note 205 infra.
152. See Michael Eagen, C.J., State of the Judiciary Message, May 11, 1978,
reprinted in 49 Pa.B.A.Q. 323 (1978). Chief Justice Eagen noted in his address that in
1976 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court filed a total of 583 opinions, whereas the
Supreme Court of California filed 191 opinions in that year, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts filed 256 opinions, and the Supreme Courtof New Jersey filed
167 opinions. Id. Furthermore, the number of opinions filed by the Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania increased to over 700 opinions in 1977. Id. For a further look at
Pennsylvania statistics, see Appendix, infra.
In their September 1, 1976 to August 31, 1977 term, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decided 151 appeals and 24 disciplinary matters. The participation of the
justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court and judges sitting by designation was
broken down by the N.J. Administrative Division of Courts as follows:
OPINIONS FILED

Majority

Concur

Concur in Part
Dissent in
Part

4
15
14
18
3
14
1
11
1
1
18

1
1
7
3
1
2

1
1
2
1
2

4
12
8
8

3

5

12

Hughes, C.J.
Mountain, J.
Sullivan, J.
Pashman, J.
Clifford, J.
Schreiber, J.
Handler, J.
Conford, J.
Kolovsky, J.
Carton, J.
Opinions Below

Dissent

Per
Curiam

Total

6

11
20
41
36
21
37
2
45
1
2
18

3
15
1
8
11
1
14

1

100
18
12
51
53
234
N.J. ADMIN. Div. OF COURTS ANN. REP. A-3[1976-1977].
During the 1976 calendar year the New York Court of Appeals filed 592
opinions:
Opinions by Type and by Author
January 1, 1976 through December 31, 1976
Type of Opinions

Author

Majority
Opinions

Breitel ........
Jasen .........
Gabrielli .......
Jones .........
Wachtler .......
Fuchsberg ......
Cooke .........
Per Curiam .....
Memorandum . ..

2.1
32
36
32
33
26
32
34
205

8
5
3
3
1
13
3
0
0

10
29
12
11
8
1,4
18
0
0

42
66
51
46
42
53
53
31
205

454

36

102

592

Total

.......

Concurrences

Dissents

Total

N.Y. JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. 46 (1977).
For a survey of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1977 opinions organized by
justice and prepared by the Villanova Law Review, see Appendix, Table II, infra.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 5 3 Expanding
upon the theme expressed by Justice Nix, Justice Roberts reported
that the caseload of the Court in Pennsylvania is twice that of these
jurisdictions.

15 4

The justices concur that change must be forthcoming. 5 5 Their
views on the direction these changes should take depends largely
upon their perceptions of the appellate function of the Supreme
15 6

Court.

A.

The Proper Role of the Court

The impact of time burdens on the Supreme Court can only be
understood by reference to the role ascribed to the state court of last
resort. Given the practical and finite limitations to the resources,
energy and time of the justices, the role of the Court in its appellate
capacity must be clearly identified so that its resources may be
allocated in the most efficient and rational way.
Although there are diverse opinions about the proper role of a
court of last resort, 157 recent literature has focused on "the
development of law" functions and the "maintaining of uniformity"
function of the highest court in a three-tier system. 5 8 The correcting
function, that of assuring justice to individual litigants in all cases,

153. In 1977, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed 27 signed
opinions per judge and 8 per curiam opinions per judge. ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS,
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 3 (1977). In comparison, the average number of opinions per
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice, based on the 740 opinion total referred to by
Chief Justice Eagen in his 1978 State of the Judiciary message (see note 152 supra)
would approximate 105 opinions each. See also note 198 and accompanying text infra;
Appendix, Table II, infra.
154. See note 152 supra.
155. Interviews with the Justices. For a discussion of the justices' views regarding
the need for change and the possible avenues of its implementation, see text
accompanying notes 143-203.
156. Justices Nix, Manderino, and O'Brien alluded in various ways to the
relationship between one's perception of the role of a court of last resort and the
proper scope of its jurisdiction. Interviews with Justice Nix and Manderino; see
generally Interview with Justice O'Brien (Nov. 17, 1977). R. POUND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1940); Joiner, The Function of the Appellate System in
JUSTICES IN THE STATES - ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE JUDICIARY (1971).
157. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE
COURTS 1 (1976). The question may be posed whether an appellate court exists merely

to correct error in the lower court or whether the highest court's principal function is
to clarify, expound upon and develop law. For the applicability of this question to the
United States Supreme Court, see P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 183 (1961).
158. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 3; R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 4,
12; D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS 2-3 (1974); Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459 (1975); ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS §§ 3.00,
3.01. Commentary (Approved Draft, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
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is thought best allocated to an intermediate appellate court. 5 9 The
intermediate court also serves the institutional purpose of hearing
the bulk of all appeals, thereby freeing the top court to perform its
lawmaking task.'6°
The perceptions of the justices of the proper role of their Court
have naturally influenced their judgments about its most desirable
structure;' 6' their perceptions also provide explanation for their
conclusions that they do not have sufficient time to do justice to their
62
task.
Justice Nix elaborated upon why the court's present jurisdiction
is not commensurate with the purpose of a court of last resort. In his
view, there are two purposes for appellate review. At the first stage
of appeal, or intermediate level, the main concern should be fairness
to the individual by operation of the correcting function. 163
Uniformity is not as necessary at this point as is review of the trial
court's use of the law as given. Beyond this stage, the purposes shift
to resolving conflicts of law and developing the law. At this second
stage of appeal, the court therefore need not be involved with day to
day review, but with the more general process of establishing the
law of the state and the creation of uniformity. As will be discussed
later, 16 4 this analysis has led Justice Nix to conclude that the
159. R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 12, 63-64. The author estimates that one-half of
the states have established intermediate appellate courts. Id. at 63.
160. Id. at 64. See also Fair, State IntermediateAppellate Courts: An Introduction,
24 W. POL. Q. 415 (1971), wherein the author concludes, after studying the operation of
state intermediate appellate courts, that the one common aspect of the varying
intermediate courts is their reduction of the top court's caseload. Id.
161. In 1925, the debates concerning the role of the United States Supreme Court
culminated in the enactment of the Judges' Bill, Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43
Stat. 936, (codified in scattered sections of 11, 28, 48 U.S.C.) which put an end to
appeal as of right from all cases in the courts of appeals. This was a result of the
prevailing view that the Supreme Court must have control over its docket to provide
uniformity and develop the law of the land. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148,
at 3-4.
In language which is applicable to a state court system, then Chief Justice
Taft presented the following argument to Congress in 1922:
No litigant is entitled to more than two chances, namely, to the original
trial and to a review, and the intermediate courts of review are provided for
that purpose. When a case goes beyond that, it is not primarily to preserve the
rights of the litigants. The Supreme Court's function is for the purpose of
expounding and stabilizing principles of law for the benefit of the people of
the country

...

[and] to preserve

uniformity of decision among

the

intermediate courts of appeal.
Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,67th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 33, at 2
(1922), reprinted in B. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1603-04 (2d ed. 1973). The ABA would apply the same

notion to all appellate courts. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 158, at §§3.00, 3.10.
162. Interviews with the Justices.
163. Interview with Justice Nix. See text accompanying note 159 supra;R. LEFLAR,
supra note 157, at 62.
164. See note 201 and accompanying text infra.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court must become more like the United
States Supreme Court through recognition that the highest court
cannot feasibly take all cases to redress injustice, 16 5 but must
concentrate on those involving important or unsettled questions of
law.
Justice Manderino has recognized that as a court of last resort
there is a limit to the number bf cases that the Supreme Court can
consider. He also believes that the Court would be able to correct
miscarriages of justice through allocatur petitions 16 6 which, in the
aggregate, would involve less time than direct appeals. 167 He does
not, however, subscribe to the theory of "grand cases" - those of
potential importance for all - followed by the United' States
Supreme Court, but sees the proper balance for a state supreme court
as somewhere between granting allocatur petitions in every case and
taking only the most compelling. Justice Packel holds the parallel
view that the Court should not restrict itself to matters of grave
importance but must rectify injustice. 168 As are several of the
justices, he is convinced that the proper balance between the two
goals could be struck if the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, acting
in a capacity of a certiorari court, 69 were to use less stringent
criteria for accepting cases than the justices of the United States
Supreme Court. 70
Justice O'Brien expressed the view that the Court presently does
not have enough time to consider new and novel problems; he
further explained that, due to the direct appeal in all felonious

165. It should be noted that Justice Nix is confident that injustice would be
adequately averted through the allocatur process. Interview with Justice Nix. He is
joined in this view by Justice Manderino.
166. Interview with Justice Manderino. For a discussion of allocatur petitions, see
notes 87 & 88 supra; note 181 infra.
167. By monitoring the decisions of the lower courts through the allocatur process,
the Court has the discretion to choose to accept for review only those cases which
involve important or unsettled questions of law or those involving injustice, thereby
reducing the time spent on less significant cases. Time is saved by the practice of
assigning each allocatur petition to only one justice for research, review and report of
recommendation.
On Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, only the affirmative votes of two justices
are needed to grant review on an allocatur petition. The Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 724(a) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977). See notes 87 & 88 and
accompanying text supra.
168. Interview with Justice.Packel (Nov. 28, 1977).
169. As this term is used for purposes of this project, "certiorari court" means one
that is given a general grant of permissible jurisdiction from which it may choose
which petitions for allowance of appeal to accept for review, thereby achieving control
over the volume and nature of its caseload.
170. The dangers of overly strict standards include the likelihood that "the highest
Court will tend to exercise too little influence over the behavior of lower courts."
JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 151.
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homicide cases, 171 much of the justices' time is consumed by
172
repetitive work required by cases where the law is already settled.
He envisions the function of the Court as comparable to the United
States Supreme Court, but with the difference that the state court
could be more precise and definite in its opinions since they apply
only in one state.

B. The Effect of a Heavy Caseload
While affirming the right of all Pennsylvanians to file appeals
and miscellaneous petitions, Chief Justice Eagen admitted that the
present volume of work is beyond the capacity of the seven justices
adequately to consider and resolve. 173 Justice Pomeroy indicated
that there is not enough time for writing or consideration of cases.
He acknowledged that sometimes opinions are not written or are not
as comprehensive as they might be and that lawyers are properly
troubled by this. 174 According to Justice Pomeroy, the need to garner
a majority and produce opinions within a reasonable period of time
operate together to create a practical barrier to comprehensive
opinions. He also said that in cases where issues are repetitive, 75 no
jurisprudential value would be served by full treatment in an
opinion. Therefore, summary opinions should not be construed as an
indication that adequate study was not accorded these issues.
As noted above, 176 Justice O'Brien is concerned that the Court
does not have enough time to deal with new and unique problems
that continually emerge in our everchanging society. He, too,
believes that the result of the time pressures on the Court is that he
cannot give the cases the necessary and vitally important attention
and study they deserve. 77 He also provided some insight into the

171. Interview with Justice O'Brien. In 1974-1975, 46% of the Court's docket was
comprised of felonious homicide cases entitled to direct appeal under § 202(1) of the
ACJA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(1) (Purdon Pamphlet 1977). Potter, supra note 1,
at 218. See also JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 6, wherein the authors
contend that criminal appeals tend to be easier to decide and are more accurately
characterized as invoking the correcting function of the court, which function
properly belongs to an intermediate court. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
172. Most of the clerks interviewed also complained about the repetitive nature of
the issues in criminal cases. Interviews with the clerks.
173. Interview with Chief Justice Eagen (letter of Mar. 2, 1978).
174. Justice Pomeroy indicated that he, too, would be troubled if he were a
practicing attorney. Interview with Justice Pomeroy.
175. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
176. See id.
177. Interview with Justice O'Brien. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 6.
The authors state: "These heavy increases in workload threaten the ability of the
appellate courts to perform their functions. Adequate performance ... requires
personal involvement and attention to detail by the judges which cannot be provided
by judges whose attentions and energies are divided among too many cases." Id.
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effect of the time problem on the individual justices, whose free time
is almost entirely eroded by the demands of the job and their own
78

sense of duty.1

Corroborating Justice O'Brien's concern, Justice Nix proclaimed
that it degrades a court of last resort to have to decide cases of no
moment which he described as the run-of-the-mill and repetitious
cases wherein the law is already settled. Nonetheless, cases such as
these are destined to result from the right of direct appeal in
specified cases, predominantly criminal. 179 He revealed his dislike
for per curiam opinions from a Supreme Court, but contended that
they are the inevitable by-product of the increased caseload and
repetitious cases, which do not call for a published opinion. 80 Justice
Nix explained that in these situations, neither the time of the Court
nor space in the case reporters should be consumed further.
In the course of his discussion about the general workload of the
justices, Justice Nix emphasized that much of what the Court does is
not visible - the reports on allocatur petitions which involve a
significant amount of time,' 8 ' dispositions of miscellaneous petitions, 8 2 the consideration of rules 8 3 which entails much background

178. Several of the justices, including Justice O'Brien, mentioned that they had
little or no leisure time or social life remaining after they performed their work.
Interviews with the Justices.,
179. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
180. Justice Nix's raising of this problem comports with what Justice Pomeroy
indicated. Due to the repetition, the court is burdened with certain cases or issues
which do not warrant the additional time involved in producing a final opinion. This
does not mean that adequate time has not been spent in consideration of these cases,
but, according to the justices, merely represents a decision about priorities in time
allocation. Interviews with the Justices.
181. See notes 87-88 & 167 supra. Each justice, on a rotating basis, is assigned the
task of writing a report on an allocatur petition, with a recommendation that the
petition be granted or denied. The research and work involved in writing the reports
were said to be roughly equivalent to that required for a full-scale opinion. The only
significant difference mentioned is that no time need be spent perfecting and
adapting the language of an opinion to suit all members of the majority. All the
justices agreed that these reports are quite time consuming. Interviews with the
Justices. Justice Manderino estimated that each justice is responsible for 150 reports
per year. Interview with Justice Manderino.
182. The miscellaneous petitions are filed pursuant to the jurisdictional grants to
the Supreme Court as specified in the text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
Justice Manderino estimated that the Court receives about 20 miscellaneous
petitions per week, requiring about two hours of reading a day in preparation for a
vote in a weekly phone conference. Justice Pomeroy affirmed the importance of the
miscellaneous petitions, but stressed that they require a good deal of time. Interviews
with Justices Manderino and Pomeroy.
183. For a discussion of the Court's rulemaking power, see notes 256-66 and
accompanying text infra. Justice Manderino estimated that ten percent of the Court's
time is occupied by rulemaking; he said that this important function is deserving of
more time than this, but any additional allocation is not feasible. Interview with
Justice Manderino.
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reading, the administrative chores18 4 and the like. Thus, along with
his brethren, he has concluded that there is not enough time in the
day, and finds himself working nights and weekends to remain
current.
Justice Manderino asserted the practical impossibility for a
court of last resort to hear in excess of 200 cases per year. 185 He
pointed out that, to obtain accreditation by the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS), a law school must not, in
recognition of the need for adequate preparation in and study of the
law, allow its faculty to exceed a maximum number of teaching
hours per week.1 86 Justice Manderino suggested that an analogy be
drawn to apply to the allocation of the justices' time from the AALS'
implementation of its awareness that a sufficient quantum of time
must be reserved for study and reflection.8 7 He is confident that a
great contribution could be made if attention were to be focused on
how many hours should ideally be reserved to the justices for time in
chambers. 88 As he characterized it, for every week spent hearing
cases on the bench, there is a geometric loss of the time remaining to
consider cases in chambers as well as to continue the never ending
task of legal education.
Justice Manderino alluded to the problem of the unavailability
of time to refine issues and polish language in an opinion. 189 One
result of this is less unanimity on the Court. 19 Far more important is
184. For a discussion of administrative duties, see notes 97-110 and accompanying
text supra. Justice O'Brien characterized their administrative burden as a "heavy"
one. Interview with Justice O'Brien.
185. This is consistent with the view expressed in JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note
148, at 144. While each justice is responsible for approximately 70 opinions per year, it
has been forcefully argued that
[n]o appellate court judge can write more than one full-scale opinion per week,
on the average, or intelligently participate with his colleagues in more than
300 substantial cases per year. No appellate judge should be expected to write
more than 35, or conceivably 40, full-scale publishable opinions per year. Even
the most learned and facile judge could not write more without the risk of
writing shoddy opinions and shirking other duties ....
R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 9.
186. BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, art. 6, § 6- 1(a)(i),
(ii). Justice Manderino espoused the view that there is a great deal of work to be done
by law school faculty, and judges as well, if they are to be able to keep up with the
law. Interview with Justice Manderino.
187. See notes 285-86 and accompanying text infra.
188. See note 177 supra.
189. See note 185 supra. All the justices except Justice Roberts believe that
refinement of opinions would be facilitated if the Court had a permanent home,
enabling the justices to meet on a daily basis. See notes 235-55 and accompanying
text infra.
190. Justice Manderino told us that the lack of time spent honing opinions often
leads to a concurrence in the result; in his view, this might be avoided if enough time
could be allocated to hashing out the ideas and language contained therein. Interview
with Justice Manderino.
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the deleterious effect upon the Court's authority which he fears may
emerge from too many per curiam opinions. Justice Manderino
proclaimed his theory of the "three M's," each of which supplies the
necessary authority to enforce obedience to the three branches of
government. In the case of the executive, commands are backed up
by might. The legislature achieves control through its disposition of
money. In contrast, the court must rely on morals or moral
persuasion. If a court merely announced - without justifying - a
result, its integrity and moral persuasion would thereby be
weakened, and the requisite faith in the system endangered. 191
Citizens must know that the court properly accords sufficient time
and care to matters that affect their rights. The medium by which
this may be communicated to the public is a well-written opinion,
evidencing profound thought underlying a decision. Justice Manderino also emphasized that a tightly reasoned opinion is not apt to
engender as much additional litigation as one that is loosely worded;
ambiguities should be eliminated wherever possible to avoid
unanticipated consequences. 192 Nonetheless, Justice Manderino did
profess a belief that the saving grace of all this was that individual
193
results - as opposed to reasoning - would not be changed,
although he reiterated his view that justice suffers if imprecise
opinions eventuate from inadequate time.
As with imprecise opinions, issuance of a decision with no
opinion is a matter of concern to the Court. The justices seem to be in
agreement that the announcement of results without explanations
and supportive reasoning, whether in a per curiam opinion or in a
concurrence or dissent noted without opinion, is a disservice to the
legal community, present and future. 194 Yet the present court is
191. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 31, wherein it is stated:
The integrity of the process requires that courts state reasons for their
decisions. Conclusions easily reached without setting down the reasons
sometimes undergo revision when the decider sets out to justify the decision.
Furthermore, litigants and the public are reassured when they can see that
the determination emerged at the end of a reasoning process that is explicitly
stated, rather than as an imperious ukase without a nod to law or a need to
justify.
Id.
192. Justice Manderino recounted the story of one opinion, from which one
sentence provided advocates and judges with a string of conflicting meanings.
Subsequently, a similar case involving the same person and facts also found its way
to the Supreme Court, which reversed that case as well - in effect for a second time.
He believes that, given adequate time to spend on each opinion, problems such as this
could be averted. Over the long run, much time and money would be spared if
ambiguities were removed at the outset. Interview with Justice Manderino.
193. Justice Manderino noted that each opinion was read by 28 legal minds,
including the justices and their law clerks. Interview with Justice Manderino.
194. One commentator has stated that a concurrence or dissent noted without
supporting reasons "is almost always meaningless and useless." R. LEFLAR, supra
note 157, at 56.
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responsible for a good many opinionless concurrences in the result
195
and dissents without opinion.
The various justices analyzed this problem as a function of time.
Chief Justice Eagen isolated the volume of work as one reason.
Justice Nix attributed the proliferation of concurrences or dissents
without opinion to time pressures, but affirmed his belief that a
justice should articulate the reasons why he is in disagreement with
the majority or plurality. Justice Manderino pronounced it the duty
of the court's members to elaborate upon their stance in the pursuit
of justice, noting that in the natural evolution of law dissenting
opinions often become the majority view. 196 However, he did qualify
this duty with his recognition that sometimes the tyranny of time
interferes with the fulfillment of a justice's duty of articulation. As
an example, he explained that the situation arises wherein a justice
anticipates agreement with the majority opinion. Upon reading the
197
majority opinion, however, he may find, for a variety of reasons,
that he cannot put his imprimatur upon the majority opinion. If the
justice were then to decide to draft a concurrence, rather than merely
to note a concurrence in the result, the majority opinion must be held
back from release until the concurrence is written - this could be a
matter of weeks. Therefore, if the justice decides that the matter of
difference is not terribly significant, he might choose not to hold up
the release of the majority opinion and thereby eliminate any further
time delay in publication. While this lengthy example may explain
the lack of opinion supporting a concurrence or dissent, it cannot be
gainsaid that where there is no majority, but only a plurality opinion
declaring the result, the law remains in an uncertain state and
further litigation on the issue is likely to ensue.

195. Based upon statistics compiled for this project, the Justices concurred in the
result 125 times without explanation; 42 dissents were noted without opinion. See
Appendix, Table II, infra. One author reported that for the term 1974-75, a "concur in
the result" supported the decision in 35 cases in which there were no majority
opinions. Potter, supra note 1, at 224. In a table revealing the actions of the individual
justices, the statistics reveal a total of 200 concurrences in the result. Id. at 231. In the
same year, 102 dissents were noted without explanation. Id.
196. For an interesting discussion of the long-range influence of minority opinions,
see Aikin, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in American Courts, 33 POLITIcO 262
(1968); Musmanno, Dissenting Opinions, 15 DICK. L. REV. 152 (1955-56).

197. Justice Pomeroy also acknowledged this situation and suggested the
following explanations: a justice's theory of granting relief may differ from that of the
majority; a justice may think the majority opinion goes too far or does not go far
enough; or the majority opinion may have relied on cases to which a justice does not
care to lend support. Justice Packel added mistake of law as a reason for a concurring
justice to differ from the majority. He also expressed his view that a justice should not
dissent on the basis of his personal view of the facts. Interviews with Justices
Pomeroy and Packel.
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Justice Manderino compared the standards of assigning
opinions on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to that of other state
supreme courts. While some courts take account of concurring and
dissenting opinions in assigning the workload of each individual
justice, 198 Pennsylvania counts only majority opinions drafted by a
justice. Thus there is, in his view, a subtle but coercive influence
against dissent in Pennsylvania because no credit is given for the
time spent on writing one. In other words, a concurrence or dissent is
on the justice's own time. While this may serve to explain the large
number of dissents and concurrences without opinions, it is
submitted that neither this explanation nor more general time
constraints supplies an excuse for not elucidating points of departure
from the majority.
II. THE

INEVITABLE SOLUTION -

BECOMING

A CERTIORARI COURT

The justices are in agreement that appeal to the Supreme Court,
as a general proposition, should not be as of right but should be in
the discretion of the justices. 199 The justices believe that control over
their own docket is necessary if they are to be able to manage and
perform their job. However, they are not unanimous as to whether
any portion of their jurisdiction should be retained on a direct appeal
basis, nor do they concur as to when they will be able to divest
themselves of their direct appeals. 2 m
Justice Pomeroy believes that, while there is no need for direct
appeal in all criminal cases, appeal as of right should at a minimum
continue to exist in capital cases and perhaps whenever a life
sentence may be imposed.

198. In New York and New Jersey the members of the highest court are
statistically credited with their dissenting and concurring opinions. See note 152
supra.
199. Interviews with the Justices. The creation of a certiorari policy was the
solution invoked in 1925 to rescue the United States Supreme Court from an unwieldy
docket. See Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 N.Y.B.A. REC. 541, 558 (1958); note 161
supra.
In 1969, Judge Robert Woodside of the Superior Court testified before the
Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee that the Supreme Court would be more
valuable if it functioned as a certiorari court. Hearing on S. 4160 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. of the Pa. Gen. Ass. (Jan. 8, 1969).
This is also the view taken in JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 135-36.
The authors argue that appeal as of right to the highest court is not necessary. In a
three-level court system, the intermediate court can be expected to provide adequate
protection for the individual litigant. They are "prone to accept the view that
successive appeals of right should be sparingly authorized." Id. at 136, citing
Sunderland, The Problemof Double Appeals, 17 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 116 (1933). See also
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 158, at § 3.10, Commentary.
200. See notes 201-03 & 215-34 and accompanying text infra.
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Justice Nix asserted a strong conviction that the Supreme Court
must be a court of discretionary appeal if it is to perform the
responsibility of a state court of last resort. He noted that this is
especially true where the justices have such a full administrative
load of budgeting, administering the unified court system, and
rulemaking,201 and advocated a transfer of all direct appeal
jurisdiction except in cases where the death penalty has actually
been imposed. Justice Packel also opined that to the extent there is a
death penalty statute in effect in Pennsylvania, each case involving
a death penalty should come to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
All other cases should be channeled through the intermediate
appellate courts. Justice Manderino recommended "absolutely" a
purely discretionary docket. Noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court hears more appeals than any other court of last resort or
circuit court, he stressed the inability of any court to carry the
present burden of the court.
In 1975, the Supreme Court exercised its rulemaking authority to
reallocate jurisdiction pursuant to the constitution and the ACJA202
and relieved itself of equity jurisdiction. 20 3 There is no question that
this power could be exercised today to alleviate the present
congestion of the Supreme Court's docket. There remains one
perturbing question: where would the cases go?
III. THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURTS AND THE SUPREME COURT

The most serious weakness of the Pennsylvania unified court
system, which inhibits the Supreme Court from relieving itself of
any of its caseload, is the small number of intermediate appellate

201. See notes 183 & 184 and accompanying text supra.
202. The Pennsylvania Constitution gives the Court the "power to provide for
assignment and reassignment of classes . . . of appeals among the several courts
....
PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c). The ACJA provides that the Court may do so by
general rule, thereby suspending all laws "to the extent that they are inconsistent

with such general rules." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon Pamphlet 1977). This
power was originally modified as follows: "[S]uch rules shall take effect upon the
expiration of ninety days ...

unless the General Assembly ...

signifies its

legislative intent to the contrary." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.505 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977-78). As currently codified, "[s]uch rules shall take effect if they are
approved by a majority vote ... of each house during such 120 day period, or may be
disapproved by either house during that period by a majority vote ..
" 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 503(b)(3). Section 503 also provides that "[u]pon the expiration of the

120-day period [if the two houses fail to act], such rules shall become effective." Id. at
§ 503(b)(4).
203. See note 66 supra.
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court judges. 20 4 In his State of the Judiciary Message on May 13,
1977, Chief Justice Eagen emphasized the need for more judges
when he said:
In this connection, may I call to your attention that
Pennsylvania has the fewest number of intermediate appellate

204. There is presently a bill before the senate which proposes an amendment to
article 5, § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, to increase the number of judges on the
Superior Court. S. 1088, Pa. Legis. (1977).
In a letter to members of the senate urging support of S. 1088, Judge
Alexander F. Barbieri, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, spoke of "the emergency
need for more Superior Court Judges" and quoted § 1 of S. 1088:
The 1975 Report of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts states
that for the calendar year 1975 there were filed in the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, which is presently fixed at a constitutional complement of
seven judges, 2996 appeals and 5448 other miscellaneous petitions and other
matters. The report reveals that the filings for such year represent a
continuation of a trend of increasing judicial business in that court. The
constant increase in the judicial business of the Superior Court has imposed
unmanageable burdens upon its judges. The failure to act decisively by
permitting an increase in the number of Superior Court judges threatens to
result directly in a breakdown of the administration of civil and criminal
appellate justice in this Commonwealth. The General Assembly finds and
determines that there presently exists a critical need to provide for an increase
in the number of Superior Court judges, that existing conditions meet the
requirements of Article XI, section 1(a) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
and that the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth require prompt
amendment of the Constitution of Pennsylvania in the manner herein
provided.
Letter from Judge Alexander F. Barbieri to members of the Pennsylvania Senate (Oct.
17, 1977), quoting S. 1088, § 1, Pa. Legis. (1977) (copy on file at Villanova Law Review,
Villanova, Pa.) [hereinafter cited as Barbieri letter]. Describing the "emergency need,"
Judge Barbieri wrote:
But the critical situation described in Section 1 [supra] has worsened, and
now has reached the breaking point. In 1976, the total of appeals was 3631,
plus the staggering burden of 6223 petitions; and already in 1977, more than
3600 appeals have been filed, with the certainty that the total for the year will
reach the utterly impossible load of 4500. This increase, at the rate of 25% per
year, demonstrates that by the end of 1979, unless emergency relief is granted,
the threatened increase of 50% would swamp the Court with 6750 appeals, not
to mention a commensurate increase in petitions filed.
Judge Barbieri further stated:
In conclusion, I submit that when a court's chronic overburden reaches
the breaking point, you have an emergency of crisis proportions. Clearly, the
Superior Court has reached and passed its maximum level of capacity to
fulfill, or even cope with, its constitutionally and legislatively mandated
responsibilities, and this situation will worsen drastically. The citizens of
Pennsylvania, particularly the litigants are entitled to the consideration
which I urge that you give to this proposed legislation. If the Superior Court is
sufficiently enlarged so that it can properly manage its caseload, the resultant
capability to give more attention to the arguments of the litigants and to
opinions which express appellate views, are bound to reduce the caseload and
responsibilities now being borne by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Inevitably, this will result in more intermediate appellate declarations of
precedential value to all litigants, which in turn, I believe, will tend to reduce
the caseloads of all appellate courts to manageable numbers.
Barbieri letter, supra.
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court judges of the eight most populated states in the nation.
Although Pennsylvania has a larger population than Illinois,
Illinois has thirty-four intermediate appellate court judges to
Pennsylvania's fourteen. Ohio with less people than Pennsylvania has thirty-eight intermediate appellate court judges to our
fourteen. And New Jersey, with sixty-five percent less people
than Pennsylvania
has twenty-two such judges to Pennsylva20 5
nia's fourteen.
It is striking to note that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, whose
membership is set at seven in the constitution, 20 6 has remained static
in size for its entire eighty-two year existence, while the number of
judges of the Common Pleas Courts, from which appeals are taken to
the Superior Court, has been increased 350 percent. 2 7 In 1895, the
Common Pleas judges numbered 83 throughout the state and
presently number 285.208 In this time period, the population *of
Pennsylvania has increased from 5,258,000209 to 11,793,909.210
Despite the creation by constitutional amendment of the Commonwealth Court in 1968, its jurisdiction is generally limited to cases
involving the state government 21 ' and has not yet been used to
alleviate the burdens of either the Supreme or Superior Courts.
Fortunately, unlike the constitutionally prescribed Superior Court
membership, the number of judges comprising the Commonwealth
Court is statutorily determined and may thus be changed with
greater ease. 212 Further compounding the size problem on the
23
Superior Court was its refusal or debatable lack of authority to sit
in panels rather than en banc, thus inhibiting responsiveness to its
21 4
staggering docket.
Since jurisdiction must ultimately be divided among the
appellate courts, the ability of one court to change is interrelated

205. Michael J. Eagen, C. J., State of the Judiciary Message, May 13, 1977,
reprinted in 48 PA. B.A.Q. 339, 340-41 (1977). See also IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at
62.
206. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 3. For the text and explanation of § 3, see note 68 and
accompanying text supra.
207. Barbieri letter, supra note 204.
208. Id.
209. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, at 33 (Bicentennial ed. 1975)
(based on 1890 census figures).
210. THE WORLD ALMANAC 278 (1977) (based on 1970 Census figures).
211. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 38 & 68 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 219
& 220 infra.
213. See notes 219-220 & 225-226 and accompanying text infra; notes 231-34 and
accompanying text infra.
214. See note 204 supra.
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with the other courts' abilities to absorb the effects of the change. 215
The justices expressed varying degrees of concern over the ability of
the present appellate structure to withstand any attempt by the
Supreme Court to cast off a part of its caseload. The evaluation of
this ability consists, inter alia, of the following considerations:
1) whether or not the Supreme Court can become a certiorari court
unless and until the Superior and Commonwealth Courts are
restructured; 2) whether, pending a constitutional amendment
increasing its size, the Superior Court will sit in panels to ameliorate
the present logjammed situation of both courts; 216 3) whether the
Commonwealth Court should be changed to encompass a broader
scope of jurisdiction; and 4) what are the most feasible short- and
long-term solutions.
Justice Roberts emphasized that as long as the Superior Court
remains burdened with an already unmanageable and everexpanding caseload, the problem of excessive caseload for the
Supreme Court will remain. He has always maintained that the
Pennsylvania court system needs an expanded Superior Court,
sitting in panels, with a sufficient number of judges to afford
appropriate intermediate appellate review responsive to the needs of
the citizens of Pennsylvania. Justice Roberts advocated a panel
system for the intermediate courts in Pennsylvania similar to that of
the federal courts of appeal, 2 17 thus making it possible for the
Supreme Court to move toward becoming a certiorari court. This
would then enable the Court to limit its caseload to a volume
comparable to that of other major jurisdictions.

215. The rulemaking power of the Court includes "the power to provide for
assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or classes of appeals among the
several courts." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c). The only time the Court used this power to
modify its jurisdiction was to divest itself of equity jurisdiction. See note 66 supra.
216. See notes, 219-220, 225-226, & 231-34 and accompanying text infra. Unlike
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, which sit in panels of three, the Superior
Court continued to sit en banc in the face of a rising caseload. Interviews with the
Justices. The justices of the Supreme Court expressed a belief that the Superior Court
should, and a hope that the Superior Court would, sit in panels to enable it better to
manage its unwieldly docket as well as the overflow from the Supreme Court. Id.
Subsequent to the interviews with the justices the Superior Court was ordered to sit in
panels. See notes 231 & 232 and accompanying text infra. Some of the justices and
their clerks speculated that a desire for enhanced prestige was the motivation for the
Superior Court's choice not to sit in panels. Interviews with the Clerks. Although an
argument had been raised to the effect that the Superior Court is required by the
constitution to sit as a court of seven (see text following note 223 infra) the justices
seemed to doubt the existence of a real constitutional problem. Interviews with the
Justices. See notes 231-34 and accompanying text infra.
217. The eleven federal courts of appeals are organized on a geographical, as
opposed to a subject matter basis. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1970). Cases generally are heard
only by a portion of the court, a panel of three judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
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Justice O'Brien suggested that in order to enable the Court to
select its cases as the United States Supreme Court decided to do in
1925,218 the Superior Court should be increased to approximately
fifteen members and sit in panels, operating in a manner analogous
to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. He is convinced that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should be writing better opinions,
which he feels would be possible if these changes were made to
reduce the volume of cases.
Justice Manderino expressed his concern that the problems of
the Supreme Court cannot be alleviated until the intermediate
appellate judiciary is expanded. A minimum of fifty appellate judges
is necessary to the court system in his view. Interestingly, Justice
Manderino raised the question whether the size of the Superior
Court, which appears fixed at seven by the constitution, 219 may
nevertheless be expanded by the legislature through exercise of its
constitutional power to create "other courts and divisions of
courts. ' ' 22° He pointed out that even if the number of superior court
judges is set at seven by the constitution, the legislature is free to
create new appellate courts, perhaps along the lines of the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Justice Manderino did say, however,
that he does not like. the idea of divided, specialized courts. 22' He
further opined that the Supreme Court, by exercise of its rulemaking
power, can and should become a certiorari court even prior to any
increase in the capacity of the other courts. 222 Estimating the
Supreme Court's mandated appeals at 325, he does not believe that
the addition of these cases to the Superior Court's load of 3500 cases
would be so significant as to militate against such a divestiture. He
is convinced that one must start somewhere to cure the problems.
Justice Nix also expounded upon the fact that the Supreme
Court can accomplish a great deal through its rulemaking power.
However, he believes that the move to rid the Supreme Court of its
direct jurisdiction should be forestalled until there is greater
manpower in the intermediate courts to absorb a heavier burden. He
also finds it inconsistent with the purpose of an intermediate court
218. Interview with Justice O'Brien. See note 161 supra.

219. See PA. CONST. art. 5, § 3.
220. See id. § 1.
221. By "divided courts," Justice Manderino was referring to a method of court
organization which creates specialized courts according to subject matter, as is

presently the case with the Superior and Commonwealth Courts, or geographical
area. For a discussion of methods of organizing intermediate courts, see JUSTICE ON
APPEAL, supra note 148, at 152-84; R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 68-78.
222. Supreme Court rules affecting the assignment of cases may be repealed by the
General Assembly within 120 days. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon Pamphlet
1977).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/3

36

Poul and Wallner: The Pennsylvania Project - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Perspe

1977-1978]

PROJECT

1077

for it to sit en banc. He emphasized that where uniformity is not the
main concern, 223 a court can and should sit in panels. Although he
acknowledged a possible argument that the constitution requires the
Superior Court to sit with all seven members, Justice Nix is
convinced that the Superior Court should sit in panels as the
Commonwealth Court does. He further expressed his opinion that
both intermediate courts should be enlarged to at least nine to twelve
members.
Justice Pomeroy described the shifting of the court's equity
jurisdiction 224 to the Superior Court as unfair to an already
overloaded court. He could not countenance any further casting off
of cases in the direction of the Superior Court until that court is
expanded and sits in panels, like a circuit court. He believes that
fifteen members would suffice if the court were to sit in panels.
Stressing the necessity for a constitutional amendment of the limit
of seven, Justice Pomeroy stated that the limit is a disservice to the
cause of efficient judicial appellate administration. As to the ability
of the Superior Court to sit in panels, he referred to a recent rule,
effective July 1, 1976, which defined a quorum of the Superior Court
as three.225 He therefore found no obstacle to the Superior Court's
present ability to sit in two panels, despite the fact that the Superior
Court had not chosen to do so. Although he admitted the possibility
of a constitutional problem, 226 Justice Pomeroy thought this should
at least be put to the test.
Justice Packel reiterated the views of the other justices that the
whole arrangement of appellate jurisdiction must be changed.
Alluding to the benefits that have resulted from the fact that the
Commonwealth Court sits in panels, he stated that the Superior
Court should do likewise, 227 and that he believed the likelihood of a
228
constitutional problem is minimal.

223. See generally text accompanying notes 163 & 164 supra.
224. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
225. PA. R. App. P. 3102(a). The explanatory note of the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Court Rules states that the committee was cognizant of the argument that a
constitutional amendment was required to enable the Superior Court to sit in panels,
but concluded to the contrary based upon its research. Id. (explanatory note).
On May 9, 1978, Chief Justice Eagen ordered that "consistently with Rule
3102 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, all appeals in the Superior
Court be heard by a three-judge panel... ." See notes 231-33 and accompanying text
infra. It would seem that this renders moot any constitutional problems.
226. Interview with Justice Pomeroy. See note 225 supra; text following note 223
supra.
227. Justice Packel sat on the Superior Court during 1972; at that time he was a
proponent of that court's sitting in panels. Interview with Justice Packel.
228. Id. See note 225 supra; notes 231-34 infra.
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Chief Justice Eagan believes that the Supreme Court should be a
certiorari court, but only after the addition of a sufficient number of
intermediate appellate judges. 229 The Chief Justice asserted that it
would be "sheer folly" to shift jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to
the Superior Court until the personnel of the latter is increased,
noting the inability of the Superior Court, sitting en banc, 230 to give
adequate attention to the 3500 appeals filed in that court in 1977.
Thus, a premature shift of jurisdiction would only relocate, not
alleviate, the problem.
On May 9, 1978, Chief Justice Eagen issued an order that the
Superior Court, consistent with the rule defining a quorum, 231 sit in
panels of three. 2 2 Although the order should provide some relief in
the court system, Chief Justice Eagen, shortly after the order was
issued, said that "[i]f the jurisdictions of the Superior Court and the
Commonwealth Court are to be increased and if litigants are to
receive a fair and adequate appellate review, additional personnel
for these courts is mandatory. '233 Thus, while the order may stem
some of the appeals which result from the frequency of per curiam
opinions from the Superior Court, 234 it would not seem that the
Supreme Court is able to divest itself of any portion of its
jurisdiction.
IV.

THE JUSTICES VIEWS ON THE
PERIPATETIC COURT

An interesting vestige of an era gone by 235 is the "riding of the

circuit" by the Supreme Court in 1977. The many disadvantages of a
travelling court were well-documented in a study of the Court which
reached the conclusion that the disadvantages far outweighed the
supposed advantages. 3 6 This anachronism results in unnecessary
229. See generally text accompanying note 205 supra.
230. See note 216 supra; text accompanying notes 231-34 infra; note 225 supra.
231. See note 225 supra.

232. 8 PA. BULL. 1392 (1978). The order provides:
and now, this 9th day of May, 1978, in view of the exceedingly heavy volume

of appeals coming to the Superior Court, presently at the rate exceeding 3000
per year, and the emergency created thereby, it is ordered & directed that on
or before September 1, 1978, and consistently with Rule 3102 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, all appeals in the Superior Court
be heard by a three-judge panel, unless in a given case the Superior Court, by
special order, directs otherwise; this order to remain in effect until further
order of this Court.
Id.
233. Michael Eagen, C.J., State of the Judiciary Message, May 11, 1978, reprinted
in 49 PA. B.A.Q. 323 (1978).
234. See notes 145-50 and accompanying text supra.
235. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 157 at 98; notes 135-41 supra.
236. IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-61. See also Wright, Are PeripateticSupreme
Courts Passing? 30 TEMP. L.Q. 303 (1957).
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expenditures of time, money, and resources as well as inadequate
facilities. 237 Many of the justices feel that their time is unproductively consumed by the obligation to hold Court sessions in three
cities of the commonwealth.
Justice Pomeroy informed us that riding the circuit did not pose
too great a time problem, but acknowledged a loss of one or two days
travelling, as well as the nuisance of packing one's clothes and
papers for transport. He also contended that the peripatetic Court is
an expensive proposition for all concerned. Furthermore, he pointed
out the drawbacks inherent in a statewide court relying on the
sufferance of individual counties for the provision of courtroom
facilities and offices; he sees a strong need for a building facility
with a library, clerical space and meal service. This would be a vast
improvement over the present situation he described. Currently,
Justices O'Brien and Manderino have no offices in Philadelphia 238
and no one except Justice O'Brien has an office in the court building
in Pittsburgh. Justice Pomeroy complained that it was very difficult
to get any constructive work done in Pittsburgh or Harrisburg,
where the facilities are not adequate for writing opinions. 239 He
further indicated that increased interaction among the justices
would benefit all.
Justice Packel has concluded that the efficiency of the peripatetic Court is impaired, and that this is not outweighed by the
inefficiency of forcing lawyers to travel to a single seat. He is
convinced that enough time would be saved and benefits achieved
thereby to justify the impact on lawyers of a permanent home for the
Court. He also revealed that his location preference is Philadelphia,
primarily because it would result in inconvenience to the fewest
24o
lawyers.
Justice Packel indicated that he did not always find phone
conversations with the other justices satisfactory and would find
more conferences beneficial. He also described problems that result
from the release of opinions from varying locales, 241 adding that this

237. IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 55, 56.
238. Interviews with the justices were held in Philadelphia. See note 4 supra.
Justice Manderino was obliged to meet with us in the courtroom; Justice O'Brien met
with us in the Court's conference room.
239. Interview with Justice Pomeroy. See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.
240. Interview with Justice Packel. Accord, IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 61. In
1978, the Court's calendar provides for 30 days in Philadelphia, 14 days in Pittsburgh,
and 5 days in Harrisburg; these numbers reflect the relative volume of cases
stemming from each area. But see text accompanying note 252 infra.
241. Interview with Justice Packel.
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creates unnecessary complication. Although he feels unaffected by
the lack of interaction, he agreed that greater personal contact
among the justices would improve the situation on the Court.
Justice Manderino also favors an end to the court's roving,
although the situation, as he sees it, is not clear cut. At the
commencement of his tenure on the Court, he was of the firm belief
that the Court was in need of one "ivory tower." Despite an admitted
weakening of his conviction, he is still certain that the advantages
of a permanent home would outweigh the accompanying disadvantages. Justice Manderino, relating his experience on the Commonwealth Court, 24 2 characterized the ongoing dialogue among the
justices and clerks as a feature of positive value. He anticipates that
greater interaction and fraternalism would lead to more unanimity
on the Court. He suggested that, with regard to the circulation of
opinions, a justice would be more likely to walk across a hall to show
to and discuss with another justice the draft of an opinion than he is
to use the phone for the same purpose. 4 3 He also pointed out that, in
this way, revisions could be made while ideas are still fresh in the
minds of the justices.
To Justice Nix, preparation of materials for transport is highly
disruptive; 244 he estimated that it takes from two to three days to get
his office functioning smoothly again after the trip so that he may
focus on his legal tasks. And in his opinion, the purpose for the
circuit no longer exists in an age of modem communications and
transportation.2 45 He believes that Pennsylvania should have a legal
center and finds Philadelphia appropriate because it is the source of
the majority of cases. 246 In addition, as a major city, it is the most
convenient and accessible destination.
He also believes that the court would benefit from increased faceto-face communication among the justices, although he maintained
that the conference calls and other utilization of the telephone were
adequate. Nevertheless, he views the ability to discuss opinions and
problems personally, in comparison to waiting for a draft by mail, as

242. Interview with Justice Manderino. Justice Manderino served on the Commonwealth Court from 1970-72.
243. Interview with Justice Manderino. One commentator recommends that the
office suites of judges be in close proximity "for the judges and their staff members to
visit and check with each other easily." R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 106.
244. Justice Nix indicated that it takes one day to pack and one day to unpack.
Interview with Justice Nix. Needless to say, it is not possible to transport the entire
office and hence the justice may find himself hampered in his attempt to maintain
sufficient continuity.
245. Interview with Justice Nix. See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 53-54; R.
LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 98.

246. Interview with Justice Nix. See note 240 supra.
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facilitating the accumulation of a majority, as well as the
understanding and reconciliation of varying views.
Justice O'Brien repeated the other justices' perception that more
daily interchange among the justices would foster understanding
and save time, noting the limitations of the telephone as the major
source of interjustice communication. He lent support to the concept
of an appellate court building, advocating an historical location,
Independence Square in Philadelphia, where the first court in
Pennsylvania sat in 1722.247 He buttressed his historical choice with
the fact that the greatest volume of the Court's business originates
in Philadelphia. 248 Chief Justice Eagen also disclosed a preference
that the Court sit only in Philadelphia, characterizing as desirable
249
increased interaction among the justices.
In contrast to his fellow justices, Justice Roberts is of the
opinion that the benefits of the peripatetic court are worth
preserving. Among these, he cited an increased understanding on
the part of the justices of the public to be obtained by sitting in more
than one part of the state and by maintaining offices in their home
communities. His preference for the present system also reflects his
belief that there is value in having the justices work in scholarly
isolation; he finds the current amount of interaction among the
justices adequate.
Justice Roberts views the present system as efficient and
economical and fears that new and centralized physical facilities for
the Court, staff, and justices would require unnecessary, enormous
capital expenditures without in any way advancing the quality of
justice.
One common contemporary justification for the peripatetic court
is that it enables the justices to retain and replenish local
perspective. 25 0 It is submitted, however, that it is unwise for justices
of a supreme court to maintain a constituency. Surely the justices
should endeavor to stay in touch with the people of this state as a
whole - without regard to regional distinctions.
Another rationalization for the anachronistic system is the
inconvenience and cost to attorneys that a single seat would
entail. 251 It would seem that this would not be so great in modern
times, especially in view of the present burden it places on taxpayers
- as well as its taxing effect on the court system itself. It is also
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Interview with Justice O'Brien. See note 15 supra.
See note 240 supra.
Interview with Chief Justice Eagen.
See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 53.
See id.
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significant that the greater percentage of the Court's cases, those of
felonious homicide, are not heard in the district where filed, but at
252
the first session after filing.
It would appear that the synergistic effect of face-to-face
exchanges of views by the justices could only foster more incisive
and developed reasoning in decisions. 253 There are times when the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts - in this case, the parts of
the Court isolated in their chambers. 25 4 Furthermore, considering the
increasing need for modern resources and facilities, the concept of a
2 55
judicial center is one whose time has come.

V.

RULEMAKING -

THE INEVITABLE OVERLAP BETWEEN

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

Much to the chagrin of law students, lawyers, judges, and
legislators, all of whom have attempted to delineate substance (the
province of the legislature) from procedure (often the delegated
province of the courts) in rulemaking, the line is forever a wavering
and elusive one. 2. 6 Hence it is not surprising that the court has been
criticized for exceeding its rulemaking powers and wandering into
252. IJA

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 54-55. One commentator reported that in

1974-75, 46% of the cases heard were felonious homicide appeals. Potter, supra note 1,
at 218.
253. The ABA recommends a "collegial" decisional process, with personally
attended conferences. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 158, at § 3.36, Commentary.
254. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, wherein the author makes a cogent argument
for adjacent offices:
Much in the way of efficiency is gained if all the judges on a court ... live in
the same community and share the same office building. Conferences,
especially nonroutine ones can be arranged more easily; less time is lost in
travel; opinions circulate faster; and suggestions for changes in opinions can
be effected more readily, thus decreasing the risk of one-man opinions. The
reasons that require officials of almost any governmental agency to work in
close proximity - so that they may have the opportunity to consult with each
other and to work as a group almost daily - are equally applicable to judges
of an appellate court. Telephone conference calls and WATS-line calls are
imperfect substitutes for personal visits and calls between adjoining offices.
The best that can be said for them is that ... these devices help to lessen the
disadvantage.
Id. at 97.
255. See IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 53, 59. Interestingly, one section of the
ACJA has been "reserved" for a judicial center. Section 3701 provides: "Pennsylvania
Judicial Center (Reserved)." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
Another section provides that "[t]he regular sessions of the Supreme Court be held in
the facility specified in section 3701 [and] as prescribed by general rule." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 504 (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
256. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 256, 272-77 (1976). Justice Nix noted
that there is always the question of substance versus procedure, with those who are in
favor of the Court's rulemaking power taking a broad view of procedure. He also
suggested the question is apt to be raised whenever the legislature does not like a
particular rule. He further stated that, in time, the legislature would become
accustomed to the concurrent power of the Court. Interview with Justice Nix.
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the forbidden realm of substantive legislation. 257 As recounted
above, the court's authority to promulgate rules is limited to "rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts" 258 that
do not "abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant."259 The present members are confident that they have acted
within the boundaries of their rulemaking authority.

257. For a discussion of the Court's rulemaking powers, see notes 258-61 and
accompanying text infra. It is interesting to note that the newly elected member of the
Court, Rolf Larsen, accused the court, during the recent election, of legislating. See
Fox, High Court and the Law, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 13, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1,
quoting then candidate Larsen:
"The State Supreme Court has too much rule-making power," he says, "so
much so that it can now supersede legislative acts.
The Six-Hour ruling (requiring arraignment of a suspect within six hours
of arrest) is one example. The 180-Day ruling (requiring a trial within 180
days) of arrest is another. What's so magic about six hours or 180 days? The
time is arbitrary.
The Constitutional Convention of 1968 gave the court the power to make
rulings without legislative authority. The voters didn't know what they were
voting for.
If the voters did, do you think they would have approved a constitutional
amendment that, among other things, empowered the State Supreme Court to
release first-degree murderers under the 180-day ruling?
The court is supposed to interpret and apply the law, not legislate it. But
with its present powers, the court is legislating - and not only in the area of
violent crime.
Now and then the court will render a decision, saying, in effect, 'Surely,
the legislature couldn't have meant that' and then substitute its own ruling to
replace plain English."
Judge Larsen, the son of a Norwegian immigrant, says that the
legislature should initiate a constitutional amendment to reduce the rulemaking power of the State Supreme Court.
"Justice," Judge Larsen says, "must emanate from the community, from
the culture, from the cultural sense of justice.
When you isolate the judges and the commissions from the people wherein the State Supreme Court, in this particular case, is answerable to
nobody - then the judges begin substituting their sense of justice for the
community's sense of justice.
And," Judge Larsen says, "that's what you call a dictatorship."
Id. See also The Supreme disgrace: Pennsylvania'stop court, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Feb. 19, 1978, § L, at 6, col. 1; The Supreme disgrace: Secret and unaccountable,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1978, § A, at 6, col. 1.
258. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c); for the text of § 10(c), see note 58 supra.
259. Id. The language used therein to grant the power is comparable to the
Enabling Act, which authorizes the Supreme Court of the United States to promulgate
rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). For a discussion of the controversy stirred by the
power granted in the Enabling Act, see generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 256, at
272-77.
Pursuant to the authority established in art. 5, § 10, the Court has enacted
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules of Procedure governing the Judicial Inquiry
and Review Board, Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules of the Supreme Court, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules of the Orphans' Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules for
Justices of the Peace, Rules of Courts of Common Pleas (Philadelphia County), Rules
of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, Code of Judicial Conduct and Code of
Professional Responsibility. PA. RULES OF COURT (Purdon Pamphlet 1977).
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Justice Pomeroy declared that the court has made prudent and
cautious use of its rulemaking power, engaging thereby in what he
termed very constructive work, 260 that of creating the "tools of the
trade" for lawyers.
Justice Nix spoke of the practical necessity of the rulemaking
power for the Supreme Court if it is to perform its role at the top of
the pyramid of the unified court system, 26 1 but indicated that the
legislature is wary of encroachment into its legislative domain.
However, the court, not the legislature, was invested with rulemaking authority, 262 and therefore no encroachment exists.
Justice O'Brien acknowledged that the Court used its rulemaking power to "legislate." Stressing that the court does not and should
not seek to legislate, he too confirmed the importance of the
procedural power to the court system. As did the other justices, he
conceded that some overlap between substance and procedure is
inevitable.
Justice Packel raised another problematic area of overlap - that
between rulemaking and a rule of decision in a case. He expressed
concern that the court has occasionally departed from precedent in a
case, when it should have utilized the rulemaking channels, thereby
affording the practicing bar the opportunity to participate in the
formation of the rule.
Although no specific questions about individual rules were asked
in the course of the interviews, several of the justices and clerks

260. Justice Pomeroy also mentioned the very time-consuming nature of this work,
which is performed by a good many people. Interview with Justice Pomeroy. There are
presently 10 rules advisory committees, with members who provide the initial draft of
the rules. Interviews with the Justices. Justice Nix also indicated that much
background reading is required if the Court is to be able to give comprehensive and
adequate consideration to the various rules. Interview with Justice Nix.
Justice Manderino also reported that a great deal of time is involved in.the
promulgation of these rules, estimating that about 10% of the justices' time is so
allocated. He further stated that the Court should give more attention to this
important task, but does not have the time. Interview with Justice Manderino.
261. Interview with Justice Nix. In an address delivered before the New York
University Law Alumni Association, United States Supreme Court Justice William J.
Brennan stated:
The administration of the business of the courts must be under rules
governing that administration. Is it not time that our profession unite behind
those who rightly insist that the formulation of those rules is not for the
legislature, but for the courts? Can one imagine a business corporation
operating under procedures devised, not by its board of directors, but by
someone else? Can anyone possibly defend denial of the rulemaking power to
the top court of the state? /
Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., March 11, 1957. For an interesting
summary of rule-making, see generally J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE
PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES

(Am. Jud. Soc'y Rep.

1973).
262. See also note 64 supra.
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raised rule 701 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration
as illustrative of the grey area between substance and procedure.
Rule 701 reduced the number of years a judge must have served prior
a
to the mandatory retirement age of seventy before he may retire as263
senior judge and continue to participate in the court system.
Justice Nix explained that the issue involved was procedural
because the participation as a senior judge in the system is a
question of administration and operation of the unified court system,
not of the qualifications of the judge. 264 However, Justice Roberts
dissented from the rule, maintaining that the Court was encroaching
on the exclusive right of the legislature to "evaluate the manpower
needs of the judicial branch and create new judgeships. '265 Echoing
the critics of the Court, Justice Roberts found that the Court was
266
operating in an area that belonged exclusively to the legislature.
VI.

THE JUSTICES' VIEWS ON JUDICIAL SELECTION

Although the initial mode of judicial selection in America was
appointment by the executive or legislative branches, 26 7 in the mid1800's an increasing number of states adopted an elective system as

263. Rule 701(a) reads, in pertinent part: "(a) Certification of availability for
assignment by former or retired judges. . . .In order to be qualified for assignment,
such judge shall not have been defeated for re-election and shall have served as a
judge . . . by election or appointment for an aggregate of at least six years." PA. R.
JUD. ADM. 701(a). Prior to amendment on Oct. 5, 1977, the rule required service for at
least ten years. This was consistent with a statute which provided that a former judge
would be eligible for temporary assignment if he has served at least one term. 1966
PA. LAWS 47. One term is ten years. Id.
The inconsistency between the rule as amended and the statutory provision
led Justice Roberts to dissent from the amendment of the rule. See notes 265 & 266
and accompanying text infra.
264. Justice Nix opined that, having been elected, a judge is presumptively
qualified. Interview with Justice Nix.
265. Order of the Supreme Court, amending PA. R. JUD. ADM. 701(a) (Oct. 5, 1977)
(Roberts, J., dissenting and citing PA. CONST. art. 5, § 5). Justice Roberts argued that
the Court was creating new judgeships "under the guise of creating eligibility
requirements." Id.
266. Id. Justice Roberts contended that the Court should have retained the
requirement which was consistent with the statute. See note 263 supra. Interestingly,
at the time the Court amended rule 701(a), there was pending before the legislature a
bill concerning senior judges. S. 234, Pa. Legis. (1977).
267. After the American Revolution, "eight states vested the power of appointment
in one or both houses of the legislature. Two states allowed appointment by the
governor and his council." ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 118, at 8. In the remaining
three states, the power of appointment was vested in the governor but subject to the
consent of the council. Id.
At the federal level, responsibility for judicial appointment was vested in the
executive branch subject to certain safeguards which were adopted to assure judicial
independence. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Before 1846, the only deviations from the
principle of judicial appointment were the elections of justices of the peace and
probate'judges in some states. See Nelson, supra note 118, at 15.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1978], Art. 3
1086

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23

an expression of the prevailing Jacksonian philosophy that all
public officials - including judges - should be elected if they are to

be held accountable. 268 Dissatisfaction with the elective system
began to emerge with the increase of industrialization and the

proliferation of political machines in major cities, 269 as opponents of
the system argued that judicial elections diminished the freedom of

the judiciary from political pressure exerted by various interest
groups and party organizations. 270 Then, as now, the tension was
between greater freedom for the judiciary on the one hand, and

public accountability on the other.
Although the controversy as to which system will produce the
most competent, independent and fair judiciary remains unsettled,
criticism of election of judges led to the development of judicial
selection plans based upon merit, using the Kales-Laski proposal as
a prototype. 27 1 To date, twenty-one states 272 have incorporated a
merit selection plan into their court systems at some level and in
varying degrees; 273 Pennsylvania has adopted merit selection only

268. See Arensberg, supra note 118, at 56-57. One writer on the Jacksonian legacy
has said that the adoption of the system of popular election was arrived at almost
completely without regard for the particular considerations of policy and principle
which arise out of the nature and functions of the judicial arm of the government. He
suggested that the system of popular election was adopted as the result of three
primary forces: 1) Jefferson's belief that the power given to judges to nullify
legislation without fear of losing their posts if their action was disapproved was
inconsistent with democratic principles; 2) the idea that American judges were
invested with legislative functions and should therefore be brought under popular
control; and 3) a growing distrust of the legal profession. E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND
TENURE OF JUDGES (1944), cited in Nelson supra note 118, at 15-16. By the time of the
Civil War, judges were chosen by election in 24 of the 34 states. ASHMAN & ALFINI,
supra note 118, at 9.
269. Winters, supra note 118, at 1083.
270. Other charges included assertions that successful lawyers were reluctant to
set aside their practices for the vicissitudes of political life; primary and secondary
election campaigning took judges away from their normal work; party machines were
more interested in finding either a party regular and/or a good campaigner to run for
office than a well-qualified lawyer; and, where the parties are weak, judicial elections
are little more than popularity contests between candidates whose judicial qualifications are left unappraised. Keefe, supra note 118, at 622.
271. See note 118 supra.
272. The states are Alabama, Arizona, Alaska, Kansas, New York, Iowa,
Nebraska, Colorado, Idaho, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, Indiana, Montana, Wyoming and Pennsylvania, plus
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. See S. Escovrrz, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE 9, 10 (Am. Jud. Soc'y Rep 1975).
273. There are currently nearly a dozen methods of selecting and retaining judges.
Appointment to judicial office by the governor is the most basic plan. Some plans
employ:
Gubernatorial appointment with confirmation by 1) the state senate, 2) the
governor's council, 3) an ex-officio confirming commission, 4) an executive
council elected by the general assembly, or 5) a council popularly elected by
the voters. Some states employ screening bodies at the very beginning of the
appointive process. These screening commissions may be composed of bar
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on a voluntary basis for gubernatorial appointments to274fill vacancies, maintaining a general system of popular election.
Justice O'Brien, expressing a view shared by many, said that
275
neither merit selection nor judicial elections are without problems.

Any institution, run by human beings with predisposed views, is
bound to be of a political nature.
Justice Manderino, aware that politics can never be eliminated
from the selection process, is nonetheless of the opinion that
Pennsylvania is now ready for a merit-based appointment system.
Nevertheless, he espoused the view that, given the political history
of Pennsylvania, with its great diversity and an entrenched
establishment, the election process has been the best way to insure
democratization of the system. 276 He does have reservations about
the constitutionality of the present system's restrictions upon the

judicial candidates, 277 which he

also finds inconsistent with

democracy and debate. On balance, he believes that a merit selection

apparatus would remove the unconscious obligations that result
from campaign contributions; judges should be free of gratitude to
those who have helped them get elected.

association members or political "friends" of the executive.... Under a merit
selection plan, the governor appoints from a list of nominees prepared by an
Judicial offices may also be filled by
official, non-partisan ballot . ...
election by the state legislature or appointment by another judge. Popular
judicial elections can be conducted on a non-partisan basis, or by partisan
ballot following slate-making in open primaries, party conventions, or
caucuses.
S. EscovITz, supra note 272, at 11. For a state by state breakdown of judicial selection
methods, see id. at 17-42.
274. For a discussion of judicial selection in Pennsylvania, see notes 111-34 and
accompanying text supra.
275. Interview with Justice O'Brien. Cf. ABA COMM. ON JUDICIAL SELECTION,
TENURE AND COMPENSATION, MODEL BY-LAws FOR STATE AND LOCAL BAR
ASSOCIATIONS

(1971).

276. Interview with Justice Manderino. This, of course, is the Jacksonian view. See
notes 118 & 268 and accompanying text supra. Justice Manderino suggested that the
Missouri Plan works well in Missouri in part because Missouri is a more homogeneous
state. Interview with Justice Manderino.

277. Interview with Justice Manderino. See ABA

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

7. For a discussion of this problem, see Anderson, Ethical Problems of
Lawyers and Judges in Election Campaigns, 41 DEN. L. CENTER J. 123 (1964). The
author argues, consistent with Justice Manderino, that a conflict exists between
election politics and the ethical standards. See also Fox, High Court and the Law,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 13, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1, analyzing the Nov. 1977 contest
for a Pennsylvania Supreme Court seat: "[T]he State Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board's Guidelines on ethical conduct have taken the zip and flavor out of the
election." The writer went on to complain that "the Commonwealth voters would be
hard pressed to even name the candidate." The article reported the criticism and
active discouragement, through the issuance of guidelines by the State Judicial
Review Board, of the use of television advertisements by candidates and characterized
the commercials as "exercises in free speech" which enabled the voter to make a
"philosophical choice." Id.
CANON
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Justices Pomeroy and Packel were the most adamant in their
disdain for the current system of judicial selection. Justice Pomeroy
informed us that, as an advocate of merit selection for the past
twenty years, he was very disappointed when the proposal was
defeated in 1969,278 when it lost by 1900 votes statewide. He is firmly
convinced that the change to merit selection would make a difference
- if only in the way people think about courts. In his opinion, the
complexion of the court should be apolitical - there should be no
talk of Democratic or Republican control of the court. 279 The public
must be assured that the courts are not engaged in political
business; 280 in addition, he hopes that partisan pressures could be
discouraged.
Justice Packel would replace the current system with appointment by the governor, based on recommendations from a judicial
selection panel. 28 ' He emphasized his belief that senate approval is
inappropriate, but suggested that a provision for retention elections
to be held approximately every ten years might be a good idea if
appointments were not for life. Acknowledging that the system
would remain political, he is convinced it would be significantly less
political than the present process.
Alone among the justices, Justice Nix affirmed a faith in the
elective process of judges. He has discerned an overwhelming desire
of the people of the commonwealth to have their judges stand for
partisan election in the first instance. However, he disagrees with
the concept of retention elections. He perceives the need to reacquire
popular approval as a danger to judicial independence; 28 2 a judge,
according to Justice Nix, must be unfettered and able to render
278. Interview with Justice Pomeroy. See notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text
supra.
279. Interview with Justice Pomeroy. This was the case in the Nov. 1977 election of
a justice to the Supreme Court; when Democrat Rolf Larsen won his bid for a seat on
the Court, the news media announced that the Democrats had attained control over
the Court. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 9, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4; Evening Bulletin
(Phila.), Nov. 9, 1977, at 4, col. 1. Of course, nonpartisan elections are one possible
alternative.
280. Judging from a recent article, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has an
image problem - that of being political: "[F]or the time being, judges are products of
the political system, and thus it is not surprising that once elevated to the bench they
continue to behave like politicians. In fact, there is no more political court in
Pennsylvania than the Supreme Court." Ecenbarger, The State Judiciary is "more
equal," Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 23, 1978, § A, at 7, col. 2.
281. Interview with Justice Packel. Cf. notes 131 & 132 and accompanying text
supra.
282. Justice Nix warned that in a city where the political leaders are strong (he
cited Philadelphia as an example) the party in power could easily defeat a judge who
had ignored their wishes, in a retention election. He also warned that a judge must
not be deterred in his pursuit of justice by fears that a decision might be unpopular
with the voters. Interview with Justice Nix.
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opinions without outside - especially political - influences. Thus
Justice Nix has concluded that tenure should be awarded a judge,
inasmuch as there exists enough flexibility in the present process for
removal or discipline of judges. 28 3 The allegiance of Justice Nix to
the elective process is based on his perception of the ever increasing
influence exercised by the judicial branch over the quality of life.
Because of this influence, the people who live in the society affected
by it deserve to have power over the selection of the judiciary.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in several contexts, the most persistent
problem for the Court is that the Justices do not have adequate time
to do all that they feel is necessary - to do justice to the cases, to
remain intellectually current, and to produce better-written and more
finely honed opinions.
During the course of the interviews, it became apparent that
something must be done if the justices are to carry on in the
tradition of the common law and its scholarly pursuit of the law
leading to its principled evolution. Our legal system is more than a
sum of individual results, but consists of reasoned law development.
Unlike Blackstone, most authorities today do not believe the "law" is
merely lurking everywhere, waiting to be found. 28 4 Instead the
concept of our system entails legal reasoning and judicial legislation. The law consists of the development and elaboration of broad
maxims which are derived and deduced from specific situations and
statutes, as well as prior principles. These maxims are then applied,
induced, and modified to deal with the ever changing situations that
confront the legal system in a changing society. Thus, there must be
constant extrapolation from the old to the new and if the reasoning
behind the result in the old is not adequately articulated, one cannot
properly induce or reason to the result in the new. The role of a
justice in this development is not mechanical but involves careful
thought and deliberation, meticulous reasoning, and introspection in short, it requires time.

283. Noting that apparatus now exist to monitor, to a much greater extent than
previously possible, the conduct of a judge during his term, Justice Nix expressed his
faith in the ability of the Judicial Board of Review and Inquiry to remove a judge for
incompetence, without need to resort to impeachment. Interview with Justice Nix. The
Judicial Board of Review and Inquiry and standards of removal were established in
the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
284. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124 (1921); Pound,
The Application of Law, reprinted in J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
65 (1975); Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
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Time is needed not only to perform the various judicial duties
but also for personal development. Total absorption in judicial
chores is a bit disconcerting.2 8 5 It must be borne in mind that the
justices are involved in the creation of social policy and they affect
the lives of many. It is therefore unfortunate if they are shut off from
the mainstream of life by the demands of their high position.
Furthermore, it would seem desirable for the justices to have
sufficient time to remain well-read and to keep current in social,
political and legal thought 28 6 to enable them to bring a broad
perspective to their task. The importance of a learned judiciary can
not be overestimated.
As noted above, 28 7 the performance of the Court cannot be
judged except in relation to the purpose that is ascribed to it. It is
submitted that principled development of the law of the state must
take precedence over repetitive review of the application of settled
law in individual cases. The latter is the function of an intermediate
court. As the principled development of the law is the basis of our
common law system in the United States and England, a mockery is
made of our system of jurisprudence when quality is sacrificed for
quantity. Assuming adequate intermediate-level protection of individuals from any injustice, 288 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
must be freed from the shackles on its time that are created by the
imposition of jurisdiction in direct appeals and be given control over
its docket. Only then can it efficiently allocate its time to build upon
the structure of our law. This is not a denigration of the importance
of safeguarding individual rights, but only a recognition that all
individuals suffer if, at the highest level of our judicial system, there

285. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 148, at 145-46, wherein the authors
persuasively argue:
[I]t is essential to the very nature of the deliberative act of judging that the job
not be performed at a frenetic pace. Time for reflection and study is essential.
So is mental and physical health. It is undebatably in the public interest that
the judge not be compelled to devote every waking minute to his judicial
duties. He should be expected to maintain non-legal interests and to
participate in non-legal affairs to a reasonable degree. It would be devastating
to the longer term welfare of the legal system to accept as a permanent
condition of judicial life a substantial burden of evening and weekend work,
or to extend the normal judicial working year beyond about 230 work ddys.
Id. See notes 143-46 and accompanying text supra.
286. See, e.g., Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943),
wherein the author discusses the taking into account of the social world. In his
impressive work The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice Cardozo described
methods of decision which require a learned judge: the "method of philosophy," the
"methods of history, tradition and sociology," and the "method of sociology." B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
287. See notes 157-72 and accompanying text supra.
288. See notes 163-72 & 199-201 and accompanying text supra.
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is no reasoned development of the laws which ultimately affect all
Pennsylvanians.
The need for reform is manifest. It is submitted, however, that
before ameliorative action can be intelligently taken with respect to
the Supreme Court and the Unified Court System, more comprehensive statistical and empirical information is needed to illuminate
further the problem areas. 28 9 This necessity has been recognized by
the Institute of Judicial Administration, which indicated in a 1972
report 290 that "only if [a comprehensive study of the court system is
done] can the appellate process in Pennsylvania adequately serve
the people of the Commonwealth. ' 291 Chief Justice Eagen has
heeded this exhortation by arranging to have the National Center
for State Courts carry out an in-depth study of the entire appellate
289. All available statistics for the state are included in the Appendix, with the
exception of those gathered in Potter, supra note 1, at 228-33. Of particular concern
is the lack of statistics measuring the caseload according to the subject matter of the
case. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 104, wherein the author deplores the lack of
separate statistical records on the individual justices, and the lack of information on
disposition of the case. Id.
In its series of editorials about the Court, one newspaper decried the statistical
vacuum within which the Court is to be judged: "From the meager statistics it
releases, it is impossible to determine how long it takes to decide its cases and whether
each justice is pulling his own weight." The Supreme disgrace: Secret and
unaccountable, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1978, §A, at 6, col. 2. A previous
editorial had quoted a court official as saying, "'[tihe court is not very liberal in
letting its figures out."' The Supreme disgrace: Delays mock justice, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Feb. 23, 1978, § A, at 10, col. 1.
In another editorial the Inquirer revealed the results of its own statistical
study of time delays. Analyzing the Court's decisions in 1976, it found that of 337
written decisions, 16% had not been decided for more than a year after oral argument,
and 34% had required eight months or more. The Supreme disgrace: Failing to meet
standards, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 27, 1978, § A, at 8, col. 1. This newspaper
estimated that the Court takes an average of 7.5 months to decide a case after oral
argument, and reported that the average time of decision in the New York Court of
Appeals, that state's highest court, as 4-6 weeks, 5.5 months as the average time for
New Jersey Supreme Court, 1.6 months for Maryland, and less than a month for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id.
Statistics, it is felt, "can provide authoritative answers to loose talk and
curbstone theories that too often pass, even among judges, for fact." R. LEFLAR, supra
note 157, at 104. The current importance of statistical reporting is reflected by ongoing
projects on Court Statistics by the National Center for State Courts. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT, vol. 1, no. 3 (Jan. 1978). See generally Groose,
The Quality of State Judicial Statistics, 53 JUDICATURE 160 (1969).
The Prothonotary's office is burdened with the additional task of compiling
the statistics in Pennsylvania. See note 139 and accompanying text supra.
Recognizing its undercapacity for this purpose, the 1972 Report of the Institute of
Judicial Administration found that "the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court has been
given many duties that do not relate to the appellate function of the Supreme Court
but rather to its administrative responsibilities." IJA REPORT, supra note 1, at 74. The
gathering of statistical data should be the responsibility of the court administrator. R.
LEFLAR, supra note 157, at 104.
290. See IJA REPORT, supra note 1.
291. Id. at 4. This report also concluded that "a revision of the entire appellate
system in Pennsylvania is necessary." Id. at 62.
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court system in Pennsylvania and to provide advice for improvement.292 It is greatly hoped that this study can amass sufficient
information to yield viable suggestions for the restructuring and
enhancing of the appellate court system in Pennsylvania and it is
further hoped that those in positions to effect judicial reforms act
promptly to do so.
Debra J. Poul
Wendy L. Wallner
292. Interview with Chief Justice Eagen.
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